

Bodleian Shelley MSS. Re-examined: A Re-edited Text of Some of Shelley's Prose Works in the Bodleian MSS. (I)

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'Speculations on Metaphysics and on Morals'

Shelley's prose works known as 'Speculations on Metaphysics' and 'Speculations on Morals' were first published by Mary Shelley in *Essays, Letters from Abroad, Translations and Fragments by Percy Bysshe Shelley* (1840). They were compilations from several prose fragments she found among Shelley's manuscripts. The materials she used were those now catalogued as Bodleian MS. Shelley d. 1, ff. 2^r-6^v, ff. 114^v rev.-111^v rev., ff. 110^r rev.-109^v rev.; MS. Shelley adds. c. 4, ff. 183^r-185^v, ff. 190^r-195^r; the Pforzheimer MS., SC 339; and a few other manuscripts, the location of which is now unknown.

The two 'Speculations' consist of the following sections (MSS. used are indicated in parentheses after each section):

'Speculations on Metaphysics'

- I. The Mind. (MS. Shelley d. 1, ff. 113^v rev.-109^v rev. and a MS. now lost.)
- [II.] What Metaphysics are. Errors in the Usual Methods of Considering Them.
(MS. Shelley adds. c. 4, f. 183^v.)
- [III.] Difficulty of Analysing the Human Mind. (Adds. c. 4, f. 184^v.)
- [IV.] How the Analysis Should be Carried On. (Adds. c. 4, f. 185^v.)
- [V.] Catalogue of the Phenomena of Dreams, as Connecting Sleeping and Waking.
(MS. now lost.)

'Speculations on Morals'

- I. Plan of a Treatise on Morals. (MS. Shelley d. 1, ff. 114^v rev.-113^v rev., ff. 2^r-3^r.)
Chapter I. On the Nature of Virtue. (MS. Shelley adds. c. 4, ff. 190^r-192^r.)
Benevolence. (Adds. c. 4, ff. 192^r-193^v; the Pforzheimer MS., SC 339.)
Justice. (SC 339.)
Chapter II. (D. 1, ff. 3^r-6^v.)
- II. Moral Science Consists in Considering the Difference, not the Resemblance, of Persons. (Adds. c. 4, ff. 194^r-195^r.)

Mary arranged disconnected fragments in the order shown above and supplied most of the headings. Did she have any other authority than the manuscripts for her arrangement? We do not have any evidence which points to the possibility that she did. If the materials available to her were the same as those available to us (i. e. the Bodleian MSS., the Pforzheimer MS., the manuscripts now lost but represented by her edition of them in *Essays, Letters from Abroad, . . .*), there seems to be a good case for our attempting at a rearrangement of them. It is true that she was in a more advantageous position than a modern editor, because she may have known Shelley's methods of composition as well as his thought far better than we do. But a careful examination of the manuscripts has convinced me that there is room for improvement in her arrangement of the various parts of this treatise. For one thing, I could not see any reason for removing the fragment occupying MS. Shelley d. 1, ff. 114^v rev.-113^v rev. from its original place in the manuscript and putting it at the beginning of what she calls 'Speculations on Morals.' Again, it is fairly certain that MS. Shelley adds. c. 4, f. 191^v should come between f. 3^v and f. 4^r of MS. Shelley d. 1. This latter point suggests that Shelley wrote those fragments in adds. c. 4 earlier and made use of them in drafting those contained in d. 1. P. M. S. Dawson* is quite sure that that is exactly what Shelley did. He is cautious enough to restrict his conjecture to those points (all of which happen to occur in the 'Speculations on Morals') at which Shelley clearly revealed the intention of placing earlier fragments. But I would like to go a little further. There are blank spaces here and there in the drafts in d. 1—mainly in that part to which Mary gave the title 'Speculations on Metaphysics'. My conjecture is that Shelley intended to insert into them relevant fragments from adds. c. 4. So I incorporated the adds. c. 4 fragments into the d. 1 manuscript. I think this text makes a better sense than the current one. Mary's order has been followed by all subsequent editors of Shelley's prose except D. L. Clark**, who thought a rearrangement was necessary. Regrettably, his rearrangement was a perfunctory one; for, after all, it amounts only to restoring the first part of 'Speculations on Morals' to its original position before 'Speculations on Metaphysics' and placing at the end of the whole essay the section which Mary entitled 'Catalogue of the Phenomena of Dreams.' I agree with him, however, in considering that the two 'Speculations' are intended to form part of a single work.

* *The Unacknowledged Legislator: Shelley and Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 238-9.

** *Shelley's Prose, or A Trumpet of a Prophecy* (Albuquerque: The Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1954), p. 181.

Although my primary concern in this article is to reconsider the ordering of the fragments which comprise one of Shelley's most important prose works, I have also tried to correct errors I note in the current editions of the manuscripts under consideration. I omit Mary's headings because they are irrelevant in a rearranged text. I shall give as an appendix a transcript of the manuscripts from which my text is derived, so that I can show the materials on which my work is based. I have transcribed cancellations in the manuscripts as well, since I believe that they will contribute to a better understanding of the text itself.

TEXT

[Paragraph numbers, and words, phrases, or punctuation marks in square brackets are editorial additions or emendations; MSS. used are indicated in parentheses after each paragraph.]

[1] That great science which regards the nature and the operations of the human mind, is popularly divided into Morals and Metaphysics. The latter relates to a just classification, and the assignment of distinct names to its ideas; the former regards simply the determination of that arrangement of them which produces the greatest and most solid happiness. It is admitted that a virtuous or moral action, is that action which[,] when considered in all its accessories and consequences[,] is fitted to produce the highest pleasure to the greatest number of sensitive beings. The laws according to which all pleasure, since it cannot be equally felt by all sensitive beings, ought to be distributed by a voluntary agent [are] reserved for Chap. (). (*MS. Shelley d. I, f. 114^r rev.*)

[2] The design of this little treatise is restricted to the development of the elementary principles of morals. (*D. I, f. 114^r rev.*)

[3] As far as regards that purpose[,] metaphysical science will be treated merely so far as a source of negative truth; whilst morality will be considered as a science[,] respecting which we can arrive at positive conclusions. The misguided imaginations of men have rendered the firm ascertaining of what *is not true* the principal direct service which metaphysical enquiry can bestow upon moral science. Moral science itself is the doctrine of the voluntary actions of man as a sentient and social being. These actions depend upon the thoughts in his mind. But there is a mass of popular opinion, from which the most enlightened persons are seldom wholly free, into the truth [or] falsehood of which it is incumbent upon us to enquire before we can arrive

at any firm conclusions as to the conduct which we ought to pursue in the regulation of our own minds, or towards our fellow beings; or before we can ascertain the elementary laws[,] according to which those thoughts[,] from which these actions flow[,] are originally combined. (*D. 1, ff. 114^r rev.-113^v rev.*) 25

[4] We do not attend sufficiently to what passes within ourselves. We combine words, combined a thousand times before. In our minds we assume entire opinions, and in the expression of those opinions[,] entire phrases[,] when we would philosophize. Our whole style of expression and sentiment is infected with the tritest plagiarisms. Our words are dead, our thoughts are cold and borrowed. (*MS. Shelley adds. c. 4, f. 183^r.*) 30

[5] Let us contemplate facts, let us[,] in the great study of ourselves[,] resolutely compel the mind to a rigid consideration of itself. We are not content with conjectures and syllogisms in sciences regarding external objects. As in these, let us also[,] in considering the phenomena of mind[,] severely collect those facts which cannot be disputed. Metaphysics will possess this conspicuous advantage over every other science, 35 that each student[,] by attentively referring to his own mind[,] may ascertain the authorities upon which any assertions regarding it are supported. There can thus be no deception, we ourselves being the depositories of the evidence of the subject which we consider[.] (*Adds. c. 4, f. 183^v.*)

[6] It is an axiom in mental philosophy, that we can think of nothing which we 40 have not perceived. When I say we can think of nothing, I mean, we can imagine nothing, we can reason of nothing, we can remember nothing, we can foresee nothing. The most astonishing combinations of poetry, the subtlest deductions of logic and mathematics, are no other than combinations which the intellect makes of sensations according to its own laws. (*D. 1, f. 113^v rev.*) 45

[7] A catalogue of all the thoughts of the mind, and of all their possible modifications is a cyclopedic history of the universe. (*D. 1, f. 113^v rev.*)

[8] But[,] it will be objected, the inhabitants of the various planets of this and of other solar systems; and the existence of a Power bearing the same relation to all that we perceive and are[,] as what we call a cause does to what we call effect, were never 50 objects of sensation, and yet the laws of mind almost universally suggest according to the various disposition of each[,] a conjecture[,] a persuasion, or a conviction of their existence. (*D. 1, f. 113^r rev.*)

[9] The reply is simple; these thoughts are also to be included in the catalogue of existence; they are modes in which thoughts are combined[;] the objection only adds 55

force to the conclusion, that beyond the limits of perception and of thought nothing can exist. (*D. I, f. 113^r rev.*)

[10] Thoughts, or ideas, or notions, call them what you will, differ from each other not in kind, but in force. It has commonly been supposed that those distinct thoughts which affect a number of persons, at regular intervals during the passage of 60 a multitude of other thoughts, and which are called *real* or *external objects*, are totally different in kind from those which affect only a few persons, and which recur at irregular intervals, and are usually more obscure and indistinct, such as hallucinations, dreams, and the ideas of madness. No essential distinction between any one of these ideas or any class of them[,] is founded on a correct observation of the nature of 65 things, but merely on a consideration of what thoughts are most invariably subservient to the security and happiness of life; and if nothing more were expressed by the distinction, the philosopher might safely accomodate his language to that of the vulgar. But they pretend to assert an essential difference[,] which has no foundation in truth, and which suggests a narrow and false conception of universal nature, the parent of 70 the most fatal errors in speculation. A specific difference between every thought of the mind, is indeed a necessary consequence of that law by which it perceives diversity and number[;] but a generic or essential difference, is wholly [arbitrary]. The principle of the agreement and similarity of all thoughts, is that they are thoughts; the principle of their disagreement consists in the variety and irregularity 75 of the occasions on which they arise in the mind. That in which they agree, to that in which they differ[,] is as everything to nothing. Important distinctions of various degrees of force indeed, are to be established between them, if [they were,] as they may be[,] subjects of ethical or economical discussion. But that is a question altogether distinct. (*D. I, ff. 113^r rev.-112^r rev.*) 80

[11] By considering all knowledge as bounded by perception[,] whose operations may be indefinitely combined[,] we arrive at a conception of Nature inexpressibly more magnificent, simple, and true, than accord[s with the] ordinary systems of complicated and partial consideration[.] Nor does a contemplation of the universe in this comprehensive and synthetical view, exclude the subtlest analysis of its modifications and 85 parts. (*D. I, f. 112^r rev.*)

[12] A scale might be formed, graduated according to the degrees of a combined ratio [of] intensity, duration, connexion, periods of recurrence, and utility, which would be the standard; according to which all ideas might be measured; and an uninterrupted

chain of nicely shadowed distinction[s] would be observed, from the faintest impression ⁹⁰
on the senses to the most distinct combination of those impressions; from the simplest
of those combinations to that mass of knowledge which[,] including our own nature[,]
constitutes what we call the universe. (*D. 1, f. 111^o rev.*)

[13] If it were possible that a person should give a faithful history of his being
from the earliest epochs of his recollection, a picture would be presented such as the ⁹⁵
world has never contemplated before. A mirror would be held up to all men in which
they might behold their own recollections, and[,] in dim perspective[,] their shadowy
hopes and fears—all that they dare not, or that[,] daring and desiring, they could not
expose to the open light of day. But thought can with difficulty visit the intricate
and winding chambers which it inhabits. It is like a river whose rapid and perpetual ¹⁰⁰
stream flows outwards[,] like one in dread who speeds through the recesses of some
haunted pile and dares not look behind. The caverns of the mind are obscure and
shadowy, or pervaded with a lustre, beautifully bright indeed, but shining not beyond
their portals. If it were possible to be where we have been, vitally and indeed—if[,]
at the moment of our presence there[,] we could define the results of our experience ¹⁰⁵
—if the passage from sensation to reflexion [(] from a state of to voluntary
contemplation[)] were not so dizzying and so tumultuous—this attempt would be less
difficult. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 184^{rv}.*)

[14] We are intuitively conscious of our own existence, and of that connexion in the
train of our successive ideas which we term our identity. We are conscious also of ¹¹⁰
the existence of other minds; but not intuitively. Our evidence with respect to the
existence of other minds is founded upon a very complicated relation of ideas, which
it is foreign to [the] purpose of this treatise to anatomise. The basis of this relation is[,]
undoubtedly, a periodical recurrence of masses of ideas[,] which our own voluntary
determination[s] have, in one peculiar direction, *no* power to circumscribe or to arrest, ¹¹⁵
and against the recurrence of which they can only imperfectly provide. The irres[is]tible
law[s] of thought constrain us to believe that the precise limits of our actual ideas are
not the actual limits of possible ideas[;] the law according to which these deductions
are drawn, is called analogy; and this is the foundation of all our inferences, from one
idea to another[,] inasmuch as they resemble each other. (*D. 1, ff. 110^o rev.–109^o rev.*) ¹²⁰

[15] Most of the errors of philosophers have arrived from considering the human
being in a point of view too detailed and circumscribed. He is not a moral and
intellectual, but also, and pre-eminently, an imaginative being. His own mind is his

law; his own mind is all things to him. If we would arrive at any knowledge which should be serviceable from the practical conclusions to which it leads, we ought to¹²⁵ consider the mind of man and the universe as the great whole on which to exercise our speculation. Here, above all, verbal disputes ought [to] be laid aside, though this had long been their chosen field of battle. It imports little to enquire whether thought be distinct from the objects of thought. The use of the words *external* and *internal* as applied to the establishment of this distinction [has] been the symbol and¹³⁰ the source of much dispute. This is merely an affair of words, and[,] as the dispute deserves[,] to say that when speaking of the objects of thought we indeed only describe one of the forms of thought, or that speaking of thought we only apprehend one of the operations of the universal system of beings. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 185^v.*)

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[16]

SPECULATIONS ON MORALS

135

CHAPTER ONE

ON THE [NATURE] OF VIRTUE

Sect[.] 1. General view of the nature and objects of virtue[.] 2. The origin and basis of virtue as founded on the elementary principles of mind[.] 3[.] The laws which flow from the nature of mind regulating the application of these principles to human actions[.] 4[.] Virtue, a possible¹⁴⁰ attribute of man. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 190^r.*)

[17] We exist in the midst of a multitude of beings like ourselves, upon whose happiness most of our actions exert some obvious and decisive influence. The regulation of this influence is the object of moral science. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 190^v.*)

[18] We know that we are susceptible of receiving painful or pleasurable impressions¹⁴⁵ of greater or less intensity and duration. That is called good which produces pleasure[;] that is called evil which produces pain. These are general names applicable to every class of causes from which an overbalance of pain or pleasure may result. But when [a] human being is the active instrument of generating or diffusing happiness, the principle through which [he] is most effectually instrumental to that purpose is¹⁵⁰ called virtue. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 190^v.*)

[19]

BENEVOLENCE

There is a class of emotions which we instinctively avoid[.] A human being[,] such as is man considered in his origin, a child a month old[,] has a very imperfect

consciousness of the existence of other natures resembling itself. All the energies of ¹⁵⁵
its being are directed to the extinction of the pains with which it is perpetually assailed.
At length it discovers that it is surrounded by natures susceptible of sensations similar
to its own. It is very late before children attain to this knowledge. If a child
observes without emotion its nurse or its mother suffering acute pain, it is attributable
rather to ignorance than insensibility. So soon as the accents and gestures significant ¹⁶⁰
of pain are referred to the feelings which they express[,] they awaken in the
mind of the beholder a desire that they should cease. Pain is thus apprehended to
be evil for its own sake[,] without any other reference to the mind [than] such as is
indispensable to its perception. The tendencies of our original sensations[,] indeed,
all have for their object the preservation of our individual being[.] But these are ¹⁶⁵
passive and unconscious. In proportion as the mind acquires an active power[,] the
empire of these tendencies becomes limited. Thus an infant, a savage, and a solitary
beast is selfish[,] because its mind is incapable [of] receiving an accurate intimation of
the nature of pain as existing [in] beings resembling itself. The inhabitant of a highly
civilized community will more acutely sympathize with the sufferings and enjoyments ¹⁷⁰
of others than the inhabitant of a society of a less degree of civilization. He who
shall have cultivated his intellectual powers by familiarity with the finest specimens of
poetry and philosophy will usually [sympathize more] than one engaged in the less
refined functions of manual labour. The mind thus acquires by exercise a habit as it
were of perceiving and abhorring evil however remote from the immediate sphere of ¹⁷⁵
sensations with which that individual mind is conversant. Imagination or mind employed
in prophetically imagining forth its objects, is that faculty of human nature on which
every gradation of its progress, nay every, the minutest change depends. (*Adds. c. 4,*
ff. 192^r-193^r.)

[20] Pain or pleasure[,] if subtly analysed[,] will be found to consist entirely in ¹⁸⁰
prospect. The only distinction between the selfish man and the virtuous man, is that
the imagination of the former is confined within a narrow limit, whilst that of the latter
embraces a comprehensive circumference. In this sense[,] wisdom and virtue may be
said to be inseparable and criteria of each other. Selfishness is thus the offspring of
ignorance and mistake[,] is the portion of unreflecting infancy, and savage solitude[,] ¹⁸⁵
or those whom toil or evil occupations have blunted and rendered torpid; disinterested
benevolence is the product of a cultivated imagination, and has an intimate connexion
with all the arts which add ornament or dignity or power or stability to the social

state of man. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 193^{rv}.*)

[21] Virtue is thus entirely a refinement of civilized life, a creation of the human¹⁹⁰ mind[,] or rather a combination which it has made according to elementary rules contained within itself, of the feelings suggested by the relations established between man and man[.] All the theories which have refined and exalted humanity, or those which have been devised as alleviations of its mistakes and evils, have been based upon those elementary emotions of disinterestedness which we feel to constitute the majesty¹⁹⁵ of our nature. Patriotism, as it existed in the ancient republics, was never, as has been supposed, a calculation of personal advantages. When Mutius Scaevola thrust his hand into the burning coals and Regulus returned to Carthage, and Epicharis sustained the rack silently[,] in the torments of which she knew that she would speedily perish, rather than betray the conspirators to the tyrant*; these illustrious persons²⁰⁰ certainly made a small estimate of their private interest. If it be said that they sought posthumous fame, instances are not wanting in history which prove that men have even defied infamy for the sake of good. But there is a great error in the world with respect to the selfishness of fame. It is certainly possible that a person should seek distinctions as a medium of personal gratification. But the love of fame is²⁰⁵ frequently no more than a desire that the feelings of others should confirm, illustrate, and sympathize with, our own. In this respect it is allied with all that draws us out of ourselves. It is the last infir[(*Adds. c. 4, f. 193^{rv}.*)

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[22] The object of the forms according to which human society is administered[,] is the happiness of the individuals composing the communities which they regard, and²¹⁰ these forms are perfect or imperfect in proportion to the degree in which they promote this end. (*D. 1, f. 2^r.*)

[23] This object is not merely the quantity of happiness enjoyed by individuals as sensitive being, but the mode in which it should be distributed among them, as social beings. It is not enough, if such a coincidence can be conceived of as possible, that²¹⁵ one person or class of persons should enjoy the highest happiness[,] whilst another is suffering a disproportionate degree of misery[.] It is necessary that material happiness produced by the common efforts, and preserved by the common care[,] should be distributed according to the just claims of each individual; if not, although the quantity produced should be the same, the end of society would remain unfulfilled.²²⁰

* Tacitus [Shelley's Note].

The object is in a compound proportion of the quantity of happiness produced and the fitness of the mode in which it is distributed, to the elementary feelings of man as a social being[.] (*D. I, f. 2^v.*)

[24] The disposition in an individual to promote this object is called virtue; and the two constituent of virtue, benevolence and justice, are correlative with these ²²⁵ two portions of the only true object of all the voluntary actions of a human being. Benevolence is the desire to be the author of good, and justice the apprehension of the manner in which good ought to be done. (*D. I, f. 2^v.*)

[25] Justice and benevolence result from the elementary laws of the human mind. See Chap.— (*D. I, f. 3^r.*) 230

[26]

CHAP[TER] [TWO]

It is foreign to the general scope of this little treatise to encumber a simple argument by controverting any of the trite objections of habit or fanaticism[.] But there are two; the first the basis of all political mistake, and the second, the prolific cause and effect of religious error, which it seems useful to refute. (*D. I, f. 3^r.*) 235

[27] First[.] it is enquired for what reason a human being should engage in procuring the happiness or refrain from producing the misery of another? When a reason is required to prove the necessity of adopting any system of conduct, what is it that the objector demands? He requires proof of that system of conduct being such as will most effectually promote the happiness of mankind. To demonstrate this, is to render ²⁴⁰ a moral reason. Such is the object of virtue. (*D. I, f. 3^r; Add. c. 4, f. 191^r.*)

[28] If he persists to enquire why he ought to promote the happiness of mankind, and demands a mathematical or metaphysical reason for a moral action, the absurdity of this scepticism is more apparent[,] but not less real[,] than the exacting of a moral reason for a mathematical or metaphysi[cal] fact. If any person should refuse to admit ²⁴⁵ that all the radii of a circle are of equal length, or that human actions are necessarily determined by motives, until it could be proved that these radii and these actions uniformly tended to the production of the greatest general good[,] who would not wonder at the unreasonable and capricious association of his ideas? (*D. I, f. 3^v.*)

[29] A common sophism, which like many others depends on the abuse of a meta- ²⁵⁰ phor[ical] expression to a literal purpose[,] has produced much of the confusion which has involved the theory of morals. It is said that no person is bound to be just or

kind, if[,] on his neglect, he should fail to incur some penalty. Duty is obligation[:] there can be no obligation without an obliger. Virtue is a law to which it is the will of the lawgiver that we should confo[r]m, which will we should in no manner be ²⁵⁵ bound to obey unless some dreade[d] punishment were attached to disobedience. This is the philosophy of slavery and superstition. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 191^v.*)

[30] In fact[,] no person can be *bound* [or] *obliged* without some power preceding to bind and to oblige. If I observe a man bound hand and foot[,] I know that someone bound him. But if I observe him returning self-satisfied from the performance of some ²⁶⁰ action by which he has been the willing author of extensive benefit, I do not infer that the anticipation of hellish agonies, or the hope of heavenly reward[,] has constrained him to sacrifice his personal advantage to the object obviously proposed. That men do so in some instances is possible, but the actions which are the result of such considerations will not fall within any imaginable definition of virtue. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 191^v; d. 1, f. 4^r.*) ²⁶⁵

[31] The writer of a philosophical treatise may, I imagine, at this advanced era of human intellect, be held excused from entering into a controversy with those reasoners, if such there are, who would claim an exemption from its decrees in favour of any one among those diversified systems of obscure opinion respecting morals, which under the name of religions have in various ages and countries obtained among mankind. ²⁷⁰ Yet[,] if, as these reasoners have pretended, eternal torture or happiness will ensue as the consequence of certain actions, we should be no nearer the possession of a standard to determine what actions were right or wrong, even if this pretended revelation[,] which is by no means the case, had furnished us with a complete catalogue of them. The character of actions, as virtuous or vicious, would by no means be determined ²⁷⁵ alone by the personal advantage or disadvantage of each moral agent individually considered. Indeed[,] an action is often virtuous in proportion to the greatness of the personal calamity which the author willingly draws upon himself by daring to perform it. It is because an action produces an overbalance of pleasure or pain to sentient beings, and not merely because its consequences are beneficent or injurious ²⁸⁰ to the author of that action, that it is good or evil. Nay[,] this latter consideration has a tendency to pollute the purity of virtue, inasmuch as it consists in the motive rather than [in] the consequences of an action. A person who should labour for the happiness of mankind lest he should be tormented, eternally in Hell, would[,] with reference to that motive, possess as little claim to the epithet of virtuous, as he who ²⁸⁵ should torture[,] imprison and burn them alive, a more usual and natural consequences

of such principles, for the sake of the enjoyment of Heaven. (*D. I, ff. 4^r-5^v.*)

[32] My neighbour[,] presuming on his strength, may direct me to perform or to refrain from a particular action; indicating a certain arbitrary penalty in the event of disobedience within his power to inflict. My action[,] if modified by his menaces[,] 290 can in no degree participate in virtue. He has afforded me no criterion as to what is right or wrong. A king[,] or an assembly of men[,] may publish a proclamation affixing any penalty to any particular action[, but....] (*D. I, f. 6^r.*)

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[33] Nothing is more evident than that the epithet of virtue is inapplicable to the refraining from that action on account of the evil arbitrarily attached to it. If the 295 action is in itself beneficial, virtue would rather consist[,] not in refraining from it, but in firmly defying the personal consequences attached to its performance. (*D. I, f. 6^r.*)

[34] Some usurper of supernatural energy might subdue the whole globe to his power; he might possess new and unheard-of resources for inducing his punishments with the most terrible attributes of pain. The torments of his victims might be intense 300 in their degree, and protracted to an infinite duration. Still, the "will of the lawgiver" would afford no surer criterion as to what actions were right or wrong. It would only increase the possible virtue of those who, refusing to become the instruments of his[(*D. I, f. 6^v.*)

* * * * *

[35]]happiness or misery of this state, [which] produces [that] peculiar modification 305 of those actions which make[s] them intrinsically good or evil, is the internal influence derived from the constitution of the mind from which they flow. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 194^r.*)

[36] To attain an apprehension of the importance of this distinction[,] let us visit in imagination the proceedings of some metropolis. Consider the multitude of human beings who inhabit it, and survey in thought the actions of the several classes into 310 which they are divided. Their obvious actions are apparently uniform[.] The stability of human society seems to be maintained sufficiently by the uniformity of the conduct of its members, both with regard to themselves and with regard to others. The labourer arises at a certain hour, and applies himself to the task enjoined him. The functionaries of government and law are regularly employed in their offices and courts. 315 The trader holds a train of conduct from which he never deviates. The ministers of religion employ an accustomed language, and maintain a decent and equable regard. The army is drawn forth, the motions of every soldier are such as they were expected

to be, the general commands and his words are echoed from troop to troop. The domestic actions of men are for the most part undistinguishable one from the other, ³²⁰ at a superficial glance. The actions which are classed under the general appellation of marriage[,] education[,] friendship[,] etc.[.] are perpetually going on, and to a superficial glance are similar one to the other. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 194^r.*)

[37] But if we would see the truth of things, they must be stripped of this fallacious appearance of uniformity. In truth, no one action has, when considered in its ³²⁵ whole extent, an essential resemblance with any other. Each individual composing the vast multitude which we have been contemplating[,] has a peculiar frame of mind which, whilst the features of the great mass of his actions remain uniform, impresses the minuter lineaments with its peculiar hues. Thus[,] whilst his life as a whole is like the lives of other men, in detail it is most unlike, and the more subdivided the ³³⁰ actions become, that is, the more they enter into that class which have a vital influence on the happiness of others and his own, so much the more are they distinct from those of other men[.]

“[T]hose little[,] nameless[,] unremembered acts
Of kindness and of love[.]”

³³⁵

as well as those deadly outrages which are inflicted by a look, a word, or less—the very refraining from some faint and most evanescent expression of countenance; these flow from a profounder source than the series of our habitual conduct which, it has been already said, derives its origin from without. These are the actions, or such as these[,] which make human life what it is[,] and are the fountains of ³⁴⁰ all the good and evil with which its entire surface is so widely and impartially overspread. It is in the due appreciating the general effects of their peculiarities and in cultivating the habit of acquiring decisive knowledge respecting the tendencies arising out of [them] in particular cases[,] that the most important part of moral science consists. [The] deepest abyss of this vast and multitudinous cavern, it is ³⁴⁵ necessary that we should visit. Truth lies at the bottom of a well. (*Adds. c. 4, f. 194^v, f. 195^r.*)

[38] This is the difference between social and individual man. Not that this distinction is to be considered definite[,] or characteristic of one human being as compared with another[.] It denotes rather two classes of agency[,] common, in a degree[,] to ³⁵⁰ every human being[.] None is exempt indeed from that species of influence which

affects as it were the surface of his being, and gives the specific outline to his conduct. Almost all that which is ostensible submits to that legislature created by the general representation of the past feelings of mankind—imperfect as it is from a variety of causes as it exists in government[,] the religion[,] and domestic habits[.]³⁵⁵ [Those who do] not nominally, yet actually submit to the same power. The external features of their conduct indeed can no more escape it, than the clouds can escape from the stream of the wind. And his opinions[,] which he often hopes he has dispassionately secured from all contagion of prejudice and vulgarity[,] would be found on examination to be the inevitabl[e] excrescence of the very usages from which he so³⁶⁰ vehemently dissents. Internally all is conducted otherwise; the efficiency, the essence, the vitality [of actions] derives its colour from what is no wise contributed to, from any external source. Like the plant which derives the accident of its size and shape from the soil in which it springs, [and] is cankered or distorted or inflated, [yet] retains those qualities which essentially divide it from all others[;] so that hemlock continues³⁶⁵ to be poison, and the violet does not cease to emit its odour, in whatsoever soil it may grow[.] (*Adds. c. 4, ff. 194^v-195^r.*)

[39] We consider our own nature too superficially. We look on all that in ourselves with which we can discover a resemblance in others[,] and consider those resemblances as the materials of moral knowledge[.] It is in the differences that it actually consists.³⁷⁰ (*Adds. c. 4, f. 195^r.*)

TEXTUAL NOTES

[I have recorded below important variants in two major editions of this treatise: (1) *Essays, Letters from Abroad, etc.*, ed. Mary Shelley, 1840, I, 240-272 (MWS.)—the *editio princeps*; and (2) *The Complete Works of P. B. Shelley*, ed. R. Ingpen and W. Peck (Julian edition), 1926-30, VII, 59-83 (J.)—the modern standard edition.]

Line 1 *the nature*: *nature* MWS.

Line 9 *Chap.*(): *a separate chapter* MWS; [*a separate*] *chapter* J.

Paragraph [3]: There is a blank space in the MS. after this paragraph. The fragment represented by adds. c. 4, f. 183 (paragraphs [4] and [5]) seems to have a place here. In paragraph [3] Shelley emphasizes the necessity for a re-examination of popular opinions, and the argument is carried over into paragraph [4]. In paragraph [5] he urges us to study our own mind. From paragraph [6] onward, he is concerned with

the exposition of a Humean epistemology. Thus there is a logical continuity through those three sections.

Line 13 *As far as...conclusions*: Part of the preceding paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 15 *The misguided...*: A new paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 16 *firm*: Omitted in MWS. and J.

Line 17 *enquiry: science* MWS.; *enquiry* J.

Line 19 *upon: on* MWS., J.

Line 21 *upon: on* MWS., J.

Line 24 *those: these* MWS.; *those* J.

Paragraph [5]: J. prints a different version of this paragraph, which was first published by H. B. Forman in his Library edition of *Shelley's Works* (1880). See *The Complete Works of Shelley*, VII, 62-63.

Line 32 *conjectures and syllogisms: conjecture, and inductions, and syllogisms* MWS. and *inductions* is cancelled in the MS.

Line 38 *depositories: depositaries* MWS.

Line 39 *we consider*: MWS. gives two more paragraphs after this; the first one is a cancelled sentence in the MS. which immediately follows paragraph [5], beginning "Metaphysics may be defined", etc. (see Appendix), and the second one is the following fragment found in another MS. (now preserved in the Pierpont Morgan Library, New York): "It is said that mind produces motion; and it might as well have been said, that motion produces mind."

Line 41 *say we: say that we* MWS.

Paragraph [7]: Part of the preceding paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 51 *objects: subjects* MWS., J.

Paragraph [9]: Part of the preceding paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 56 *force: force* MWS.; *power* J.

of thought: thought MWS.

Line 61 *and*: Omitted in MWS. and J.

Line 73 *or: and* MWS.; *or* J.

[*arbitrary*]: Cancelled in the MS. but no substitute supplied.

Line 74 *they are*: MWS. and J. insert "all" after this.

Line 78 [*they were*]: Cancelled in the MS. but no substitute supplied.

Line 83 *accord[s with the]*: Mary's reconstruction of an unfinished sentence.

Paragraph [12]: This paragraph occupies the first half of a MS. sheet (d. 1, f. 111^v rev.),

of which the second half is left blank. The passage which ought to be placed here may be the one found in adds. c. 4, f. 184 (paragraph [13]). It deals with the difficulty of analyzing the human mind, and its contents have some connection with those of paragraph [12]. As in paragraph [12] the author speculates on the possibility of devising a scale "according to which all ideas might be measured", so in paragraph [13] he mentions a mirror which might reflect all the ideas in a person's history. But they are probably destined to remain mere speculations. It seems all but impossible to penetrate through to the depth of the human mind. Though the human mind is difficult to analyze, we are intuitively conscious of the existence of our mind. Yet, how do we know the existence of other minds? Paragraph [14] discusses this problem, thus continuing the thought in paragraph [13].

Line 99 *light: eyes* MWS., J.

Line 106 *a state of* : Left thus blank in the MS. Mary's ingenious conjecture was "passive perception," which J. adopts.

Paragraph [14]: MWS. (followed by J.) prints after this paragraph a passage beginning "We see trees, houses, fields,..." and ending "Mind cannot be considered pure" (see *Complete Works*, VII, 61). The location of the MS. for the passage remains unknown to me. I could not find it among the Bodleian MSS.

Paragraph [15]: Shelley argues at the end of paragraph [14] that analogy is the law by which we deduce the existence of other minds. Paragraph [15] is a continuation in thought of paragraph [14] in that it stresses the idea of man as a pre-eminently imaginative being, because analogy may be considered one of the operations of the imagination. Yet, two thirds of the argument in paragraph [15] have already been incorporated in paragraph [10]. This paragraph might well have been given a place among these notes. A section entitled "Catalogue of the Phenomena of Dreams, as Connecting Sleeping and Waking", of which the MS. is not extant, follows this paragraph in MWS. (I, 284-251) and J. (VII, 66-67).

Line 121 *?arrived*: Doubtful reading. *arisen* MWS., J.

Line 127 *speculation: speculations* MWS., J.

Line 134 *of beings: [of beings]* J.

Line 137 [*Nature*]: Supplied by Mary.

Line 143 *The regulation...*: A new paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 150 [*he*]: *it* MWS., J. Shelley first wrote "the human mind" then changed it to "[a] human being," but he forgot to change the pronoun referring to it.

Line 151 *virtue*: The following passage occurs in the MS. after this: “And benevolence, or the desire to be the author of good, united with justice, or an apprehension of the manner in which that good is to be done, constitutes virtue.” MWS. (and J.) follows the MS. in printing it as it is. But Shelley marks it off by a square bracket as if he intended it to be deleted, and after a few cancelled lines he gives, at the bottom of the same sheet, the notation “Justice & Benevolence,” probably the headings for the sections which were to follow immediately after this. Besides, the argument of the passage is repeated towards the end of the “Justice and Benevolence” sections (paragraph [24]). Those are the reasons I omit the passage.

Paragraph [19]: We find the following passage which begins in the middle of a sentence on a MS. sheet (adds. c. 4, f. 192^r), the second half of which is occupied by the first part of the “Benevolence” section: “question itself proceeds upon a mistake of the terms of the proposition which it contains. It remains to be stated in what manner the sensations which constitute the basis of virtue originate in the human mind, what are the laws which it receives there, how far the principles of mind allow it to be an attribute of a human being, and lastly what is the probability of persuading mankind to adopt it as a universal and systematical motive of conduct.” Mary printed this, omitting the incomplete sentence, in her edition of ‘Speculations on Morals’, immediately before the “Benevolence” section. J. prints this passage as it is in the MS. For the reason I omit it, see the note on line 151 above.

Line 157 *discovers*: [*attains to a knowledge*] J.

Line 163 *without any other...as is indispensable*: *without any other necessary reference to the mind by which its existence is perceived, than such as is indispensable* MWS.

J. puts “its existence is perceived than” in brackets but otherwise follows MWS.

Line 167 *limited*: J. prints after this the bracketed sentence in the MS., beginning “Every one has...”. See the note on line 174 below.

Line 173 [*sympathize more*]: Cancelled in the MS., but no substitute provided.

Line 174 *manual labour*: MWS. has after this the following sentence: “Every one has experience of the fact, that to sympathise with the sufferings of another, is to enjoy a transitory oblivion of his own.” Actually, it occurs in the MS. a few sentences earlier, before “Thus an infant,...” It is bracketed. Shelley may have meant it as a footnote for the sentence preceding it. But it is more likely that he intended to delete it. In any case, at the position where Mary put it, it shows no apparent logical continuity from the previous part.

Line 174 *The mind...*: A new paragraph in MWS. and J.

mind: imagination J.

Line 177 *imagining forth: imaging forth* MWS.; [*imaging forth*] J.

Paragraph [20]: Part of the preceding paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 185 *mistake[,] is: mistake: it is* MWS., J.

Line 186 *blunted and rendered torpid*: Bracketed in J.

Line 190 *Virtue is...*: Part of the preceding paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 193 *All the theories...*: A new paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 195 *those elementary emotions of: the elementary emotions of* MWS., J.

J. brackets this.

Line 208 *infir*[: The sentence breaks off here at the end of adds. c. 4, f. 193^v. The passage continues on to the Pforzheimer MS., SC 339 (*Shelley and his Circle*, ed. K. N. Cameron, IV, 733-8).

Paragraphs [22] and [23] seem to be a continuation of the "Justice" section in the Pforzheimer MS., SC 339, because the argument in SC 339 for the just distribution of material happiness is carried over, though in somewhat more generalized terms, into these paragraphs. Paragraphs [24] and [25] may be regarded as a recapitulation of the "Benevolence" and "Justice" sections as a whole. There is the following uncanceled sentence before paragraph [22]: "It is possible to conceive a system of forms less imperfect than that according to which human society is actually administered." I omit it because it appears to be an earlier version of paragraph [22].

Line 221 *proportion of: proportion to* MWS., J.

Line 222 *fitness: correspondence* MWS., J.

Line 225 *constituent* : Left thus blank in the MS. MWS. supplies "parts"; J. gives "[parts]".

Line 226 *two portions: two great portions* MWS.

Line 230 *See Chap.---*: Omitted in MWS. and J.

Line 236 *First[,] it is enquired*: MWS. has after this "'Wherefore should a man be benevolent and just?' The answer has been given in the preceding chapter," and J. follows MWS. in this. The passage Mary refers to is the first of the two paragraphs which occur on adds. c. 4, f. 191^r, but what Shelley indicates is clearly the second one, beginning "It is enquired for what reason...". Mary has given both of them earlier in her text. I cannot find any suitable place in my text for the first paragraph, which runs as follows: "But wherefore should a man be

benevolent and just? The immediate emotions of his nature especially in its most inartificial state prompt him to inflict pain and to arrogate dominion. He desires to heap superfluities to his own store, although others perish with famine. He is propelled to guard against the smallest invasion of his own liberty, though he reduces others to a condition of the most pitiless servitude. He is revengeful, proud and selfish. Wherefore should he curb these propensities?"

Line 237 *misery: pain* MWS., J.

Line 242 *he persists: a man persists* MWS., J.

Line 243 *and: he* MWS., J.

action, the: action. The MWS., J.

Line 244 *exacting of a moral: exacting a moral* MWS., J.

Line 249 *ideas?:* In the MS. we find Shelley's note after this that reads, "A common Sophism &c.", which I take to convey his intention of placing here a passage on adds. c. 4, f. 191^v.

Line 256 *dreade[d]: dreadful* MWS., J.

Line 259 *to oblige: oblige* MWS.

Line 263 *to sacrifice: to such an act.* MWS.; *to sacrificize...* J. Mary adds a note after this: "A leaf of manuscript is wanting here, manifestly treating of self-love and disinterestedness." Adds. c. 4, f. 191^v breaks off with the words "to sacrificize", leaving the sentence incomplete; hence Mary's invention of "to such an act." The fact is that the sentence continues on to a passage, which Mary omitted from her text, at the beginning of d. 1, f. 4^r. J. also omits this passage.

Line 270 *obtained: prevailed* MWS.

Line 271 *Yet[,] if: Besides that if,* MWS., J.

Line 280 *sentient beings: the greatest number of sentient beings* MWS.

beneficent: beneficial MWS.

Line 286 *consequences: consequence* MWS.

Line 287 *enjoyment: enjoyments* MWS., J.

Line 293 *action[, but...]:* In the MS. there is a blank space of five or six lines after this, but I could not find any fragment Shelley might have intended to insert there. J. prints after this "[but that is not immoral because such penalty is affixed]"; the MS. has the following cancelled sentence: "but that act is not immoral because the penalty is affixed."

Line 294 *Nothing is...:* Part of the preceding paragraph in MWS. and J.

Line 296 *consist[.] not in: consist in not* MWS., J.

Line 303 *who, refusing: who refuse* MWS.

his[: The passage thus ends in mid-sentence where d. 1, f. 6^r ends.

A page is torn off after this. MWS. supplies "tyranny" here. J. has "[tyranny]."

Paragraphs [35]-[39]: The contents of these paragraphs, the MS. of which occupies adds. c. 4, ff. 194^r-195^r, seem to have no immediate connection with any other sections of the treatise. I put them here at the end of the whole essay, because I cannot think of any place to fit them in.

Line 305 *]happiness...flow*: The paragraph begins thus in the middle of a sentence. Mary edited this as follows: "The internal influence, derived from the constitution of the mind from which they flow, produces that peculiar modification of actions, which makes them intrinsically good or evil." J. has "...happiness or misery of this state, that which produces that peculiar modification of those actions which make them intrinsically good or evil, is—the internal influence", etc.

Line 326 *composing: who, composes* MWS.; *who composing* J.

Line 340 *or: and* MWS., J.

Line 342 *overspread*: MWS. gives the following sentence after this: "and though they are called minute, they are called so in compliance with the blindness of those who cannot estimate their importance"; in the MS. this occurs in parentheses between "such as these" and "which make human life." Shelley puts a vertical stroke across the sentence, which I take to indicate his intention of deletion. J. follows MWS. in printing it.

Line 345 *this...cavern: these...caverns* MWS.

Line 346 *Truth...well*: Omitted in MWS. and J. This sentence is not cancelled but underlined in the MS.

Line 350 *another[.] It: another, it* MWS.

Line 355 *government: the government* MWS., J.

Line 358 *opinions: opinion* MWS., J.

Line 360 *so*: Omitted in MWS and J.

Line 362 *wise: ways* MWS.

Line 363 *which derives: which while it derives* MWS.; *which whilst it derives* J.

Line 366 *whatsoever: whatever* MWS., J.

APPENDIX : Transcript of the MSS.*

[Note that here square brackets enclose, not, as in the text, editorial additions or conjectures, but cancellations in the MSS.; square brackets within square brackets ([[]]) indicate cancellations within a cancelled phrase or sentence; words in angle brackets (< >) and/or preceded by a query represent conjectural readings; illegible words or part of a word are indicated by dots in angle brackets, the number of dots representing the approximate number of indecipherable letters; inserted words or phrases are surrounded by (「 」); () before and ([] after an incomplete word or sentence indicate that MS. sheets are missing before or after it; (/) denotes line division and (//) page division.]

[MS. Shelley adds. c. 4]

(*f. 183^r*) We do not attend [with] sufficiently to what passes within / ourselves.— We combine words, combined a thousand times / before. In our minds we assume [wh] entire opinions, & / in the expression of those opinions entire phrases when / we would philosophize— Our whole style 「of expression & sentiment」 is infected with / the tritest plagiarisms. Our words are dead, our / thoughts are cold & borrowed.

Let us contemplate facts, let us [in mind as in / the sciences of external things] 「in the great study of / ourselves」 resolutely compel / the mind to a rigid consideration of itself. [Let / us enumerate ?indisputable] We are not content / with conjectures & [inductions] & syllogisms in / sciences regarding external objects. [We despise / the vain theorists who alledge(*sic*) that perhaps the / Earth, once red hot is now becoming cool & that it / will eventually a thousand absurdities to / account for magnetism] As in these, let [one] us / also in considering the phænomena of mind / severely collect those facts which cannot be / disputed. [This advantage] Metaphysics will // (*f. 183^v*) possess 「this conspicuous advantage」 over [all their topics of reasonin] 「every other」 science[s], that / [the mind of every one] 「each student」 [who] 「by」 attentively refer[s]ring to his / own mind may ascertain the authorities upon which / [it is supported] any assertions regarding it are / supported. There can thus be no deception, we ourselves / being the depositories of the evidence, [at once the / judges & subjects] of the subject which we consider / [Metaphysics may be defined as an enquiry concerning / those things belonging to or connected with the internal / nature of man.] Metaphysics may be a

(*f. 184^r*) If it were possible that a person should give / a faithful history of his being

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from the/ earliest epochs of his recollection, a picture/ would be presented such as
the world has/ never contemplated before. [It is that which/ is best] A mirror would
be held up to all/ men in which [their recollections] they might/ behold their own
recollections, & in dim per-/ -spective their shadowy hopes & fears,—all/ that they
dare not, or that daring and/ desiring, they could not expose to the/ open light of
day—[Let] 「But」 thought 「can with difficulty」 visit/ the intricate & winding cham-
bers which/ it inhabits.—[Let it] It is like a river/ whose rapid & perpetual stream
flows/ outwards;—like one in dread who speeds/ thro the recesses of some haunted
pile/ & dares not look behind. The caverns/ of the mind are obscure & shadowy,
or/ pervaded with a lustre, beautifully bright// (*f. 184^v*) indeed, but shining not beyond
their portals./ If it were possible to be where we have/ been, vitally & indeed— if
at the moment/ of our presence there we could [describe]/ define the results of our
experience—/ if the passage from sensation to/ reflexion—from a state of [passivene]/
to voluntary contemplation were/ not so dizzying & 「so」 tumultuous—this/ attempt
would be less difficult.—

(*f. 185^r*) Most of the errors of philosophers have ?arrived/ from considering the
human being in 「a point of view」 too/ detailed & circumscribed. He is not a moral/
& [an] intellectual,—but also, and preeminently,/ an imaginative being. His own mind
is/ his law; his own mind is all things to him./ If we would arrive at any knowledge/
which should be serviceable from the practical/ conclusions to which it leads, we
ought/ to consider, the mind of man & the [world]/ universe as the great whole on
which/ to excersise(*sic*) our speculation.—[and]/ Here, above all, verbal disputes ought/
<to> be laid aside, tho' this had [been] 「long」 been/ their chosen field of battle. It
imports/ little to enquire whether thought be dis/ tinct from the objects of thought.—
The/ use of the words external & internal/ as applied to the establishment of this/
distinction have been the symbol &/ the source of [interminable] 「much」 [dispute] /
[It is] This is merely an affair of words,/ and [it seems] as the dispute deserves/
to say, that [if] when speaking// (*f. 185^v*) of the objects of thought we indeed/ only
describe one of the [operations of/ our mind, &] forms of thought, or that/ speaking
of thought we only apprehend/ one of the operations of the universal/ system of beings.
Among the great/ philosophers who

(*f. 190^r*) Speculations on Morals on truth/ Chapter one /

On the of Virtue

Sect 1 General view of the nature & objects of virtue 2 The origin/ & basis of

virtue as founded on the elementary principles of mind/ 3 The laws which flow from the nature of mind regulating the/ application of these principles to human actions.

4 Virtue, a possible/ attribute of man. / _____

We [find ourselves] 「exist」 in the midst of 「a」 multitude of beings like ourselves,/ [and] [our actions] upon whose happiness most of 「our」 actions [have] 「exert」 some/ obvious & decisive influence. [This we infer from perceiving that/ their actions affect our own perceptions with pleasure or with/ pain.] [It is an elementary principle of our nature that we/ should seek [the one] 「pleasure」 & avoid [the other] 「pain」.] [A tendency to pro/ duce the one is called good; the other evil.] Nor is it only/ [in relation to the pec] [his own peculiar feelings that any/ man applies these epithets [of good or evil] to the [subs] [agents]/ of the material world.] [Poison is still considered [as] evil by him/ as sunshine is considered 「good」 altho he should possess an antidote/ against the one, & be incapacitated by blindness from deriving/ benefit from the other. It is the same in the moral/ world.] [The tendencies which exist in the human mind to/ produce in others the [feeling] 「sentiment」 of pain or pleasure, are called/ virtuous & vicious; words correlative of good & evil. These/ tendencies are considered virtuous or vicious even altho they should/ not promote the pleasure of the person who thus pronounces/ on their nature. They are susceptible 「also」 like material agencies/ of degree & modification; and their value is always determi]

(f. 190^o) [The tendencies which exist in the agencies of the material/ world to produce [pain or pleasure] 「them」, are called good or/ evil; those which exist in the human mind are called/ virtuous & vicious. A man is virtuous in proportion/ as he desires to [be the author of] 「produce」 pleasure. An action/ is [virtuous] 「good」 in proportion as it actually produces/ pleasure.]

The regulation of this influence, is the object of moral science.

We know that we are susceptible of receiving painful/ or pleasurable impressions of greater or less intensity &/ duration. That is called good which produces pleasure,/ that is called evil which produces pain. These are general/ names applicable to every class of causes from which an/ overbalance of pain or pleasure [shall] 「may」 result. 「But」 When [the]/ human [mind] 「being」 is the 「active」 instrument of generating or diffusing/ happiness, [its action is called benevolence] 「the principle thro which it is most effectually」 「instrumental to that purpose, is called」⁽¹⁾ 「virtue」.⁽²⁾ 【And bene-/ -volence, or the desire to be the author of good, united/ with [a sense of] justice, or an [percep- tion] 「apprehension」 of the manner/ in which that good is to be done, constitutes

virtue.—

[It [is] 'has been' a generally received opinion that men ought/ to be virtuous,
that] [Indeed a mere explanation of the/ meaning of the [word] 'term virtue' is suffi-
cient to make the truth/ of this opinion evident; if systems]/ Justice & Bene-
volence]

(f. 191^r) [If these tendencies did not [proceed] 'operate' beyond the limits of/ our
own being]

But Wherefore should a man be benevolent & just? The im-/ -mediate emotions of
his nature especially in [his] 'its' most inar/ -tificial state prompt him to inflict pain
and to arro/ -gate dominion. [When civilization enfeebles the propensi-/ -ties of
revenge and pride] [He is revengeful & proud] He/ desires to heap superfluities to
hi[mself]'s 'own store', [whilst] 'altho' others perish/ with famine. He is propelled to
guard against the/ smallest invasion of his own liberty, tho he [tyrannizes]/ reduces
others to a condition of the most pitiless servi-/ -tude. He is revengeful proud &
selfish. Wherefore should/ he curb these propensities?

It is enquired for what reason a human being should/ engage in procuring the
happiness or refrain from/ producing the misery of another? When a reason/ is re-
quired to prove the [property] necessity of adopting/ any system of conduct, what is it
that the objector/ demands? He requires [to know] proof of that system/ of conduct
being [that most] [which] such as will most/ effectually promote the happiness of man-
kind. To demons/ -trate this, is to render a moral reason. Such is the object of virtue.
(f. 191^v) A common sophism, which like many others depends/ on the abuse of a
metaphoral(*sic*) expression to a literal/ purpose has produced much of the confusion [in]
which/ [some] has involved the theory of morals. It is said that/[unless] [it] no person
is bound to [adopt any course] be/ just or kind, if on his neglect, he should fail to/
incur some penalty. Duty is obligation, there can/ be no obligation without an obliger.
Virtue is a law/ The [prin] prince 'to which it is' the will of the law giver that
we 'men'^(s) / should conform(*sic*),—[to] which will we should in/ no manner be bound to
obey unless some dreade(*sic*)/ [penalty] 'punishment' were attached to disobedience.
[We might/ decieve(*sic*) & 'to' defraud, that he might innocently indulge/ in murder &
rapine were it not for Hell & the/ gibbet] '[Such philosophy <....>]/<ma...end> that
<...> <...>' / This is the philosophy of slavery & superstition.

In fact no person can be bound obliged without/ some power preceding to bind
& to oblige. If I observe/ a man bound hand & foot I [know] ['<...>'] that some

one bound him./ But if I observe him returning self-satisfied from the/ performance of some action by which he has been the/ willing author of extensive benefit. I do not infer/ That the [ant] anticipation of hellish agonies, or the/ hope of heavenly reward has constrained him to sacrifice[

(f. 192^r)

7

]question itself proceeds upon a mistake of the terms of the/ proposition which it contains. It remains to be stated in/ what manner [the feelings] [benevolence] 「The sensations which constitute the basis of virtue」 originate[s] in the/ human mind, what are the laws which it receives there,/ how far the principles of mind allow it to be an attri-/ -bute of a human being, & lastly—what [are the hopes]/ is the probability of persuading mankind to adopt it/ as a universal & systematical motive of conduct.

Benevolence

There is a class of [sensations] 「emotions」 which we instinctively avoid/ [We feel] A human being such as 「is」 man considered in his orig-/ -in, a child a [day] 「month」 old has a very imperfect consciousness/ of the existence of other natures resembling itself. All the/ energies of its being are directed to the extinction of the/ pains with which it is perpetually assailed. At length/ it [attains to a knowledge] 「discovers」 that it is surrounded/ by natures susceptible of [the same] [emotions] 「sensations」 similar/ to its own. It is very late before children [acquire/ a conviction of] attain to this knowledge. If a child/ observes without emotion its nurse or its mother suffering/ acute pain, it is attributable rather to ignorance than/ insensibility. [At length] So soon as the [expressions] 「accents」 & gestures/ significant of pain are referred to the feelings which/ they express they [excite] 「awaken」 in the mind of the beholder/ a desire that they should cease. Pain is thus apprehended/ to be evil for its own sake without 「any other」 necessary reference// (f. 192^v) to the mind by which its [existence is perceived, than] such as/ is indispensable to its perception. [Our sensations indeed/ all originate] The tendencies of our original sensations/ indeed, all have for their object the preservation of/ our individual being But these are passive & unconscious./ [So soon] 「[But] in proportion」 as the mind acquires an active power [there/ is an] [in] [to] the empire of these tendencies [is no/ longer] becomes limited. 【Every one has experience of the/ fact [that] that 「to」 sympathies with the sufferings of another/ [is entirely without retrospect] is to [feel] 「enjoy」 a transitory/ oblivion of his own】 Thus an infant [is selfish, because]/ a savage, & a solitary beast is selfish because its/ mind, [has never] 「is incapable」 receiv[ed]ing an 「accurate」 intimation of the nature/ of

pain as existing beings resembling itself [Those of acute/ mental] The inhabitant of a highly civilized com- / -munity will [be] more acutely sympathize with the/ sufferings & enjoyments ⁽⁴⁾ of others than the inhabitant of a society of a less degree/ of civilization. He who shall have cultivated his/ intellectual powers by familiarity with the finest/ specimens of poetry & philosophy will usually [sym- / -pathise more] than one engaged in the/ less refined functions of manual labour. [The reason]/ [It is because these 'the' imag the imagination] '[human] mind' acquires a/ [strength] [by exercise to a power of conceiving (*sic*) that// (*f. 193^r*) the existence of facts intensely the existence of facts which/ to surround the undisciplined mind] *Virtue is thus entirely/ a refinement of civilized life, a creation of the human mind/ or rather a combination which it has made according/ to elementary rules contained within itself, of the feelings/ suggested by the relations established between man & man

The [imagination] 'mind' 'thus' acquires by exercise a habit as it were/ of perceiving & abhorring evil however remote from the/ immediate sphere of sensations with which that indivi- / dual mind is conversant. Imagination or mind employed/ in prophetically [imagining forth] '[deline'] its objects, is that/ faculty of human nature on which every gradation of/ its progress, nay every, the minutest change depends./ It is [in this sense that wisdom & virtue may be said to be inseparable &/ criteria of each other ⁽⁵⁾]

Pain or pleasure if subtly analysed will be found to/ consist entirely in prospect. The only distinction between/ the selfish man, & the virtuous man, is that the/ [for] imagination of the former is confined within a narrow/ limit, whilst that of the latter embraces a comprehen- / -sive circumference. [It is] In this sense wisdom & virtue/ may be said to be inseparable & criteria of each/ other. Selfishness is thus the offspring of ignorance/ & mistake; is the portion of [torpid] 'unreflecting' infancy, & savage/ solitude or those whom toil or evil occupations/ have blunted & rendered ⁽⁶⁾ torpid; disinterested benevolence

(*f. 193^v*)

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is the product of [im] a cultivated imagination, [the/ poet the philos] and has an intimate connexion with/ all the arts which add ornament or dignity or power/ or stability to the social state of man.

[Justice]

*Virtue &c See page 9. [It is] All the theories which have/ refined & exalted

humanity, or those which have been devised as/ alleviations of its mistakes & evils, have [rested on something] been/ based upon [disinterestedness] those elementary [disinterestedness] emotions/ [which] of disinterestedness which we feel to constitute the majesty/ of our nature. Patriotism, as it existed in the antient republics/ [is by no means] 「was never」 as has been supposed, a calculation of personal/ [interest] 「advantages. When」 Mutius Scaevola [?fl] thrust his hand into the burning coals/ and Regulus returned to Carthage, [&] and Epicharis sustained/ the rack [on which] silently in the torments of which she knew that/ she would speedily [expire] 「perish」, rather than betray the conspirators to/ the tyrant^x ; these illustrious persons certainly made [no] 「a small」 estimate/ of their private interest. [The latter dis] [It] If it be said that/ they sought posthumous fame; instances are not wanting in his/ tory which prove that men have even defied infamy for the/ sake of good. But there is a great error in the world with/ respect to the selfishness of fame. It is certainly possible/ that a person should seek distinctions [as] as a medium of perso-/ -nal gratification. But the love of fame is frequently no/ more than a desire that the feelings 「of others」 should confirm, illus/ -trate, & sympathise with, our own. In this respect it is allied/ with all that draws us out of ourselves. It is the last infir[/ ^xTacitus (f. 194^r)]happiness or misery of this state, [that which] produces the peculiar/ modi- fication of those actions which make them intrinsically good/ or evil, is the internal influence [which the peculiarity of each]/ derived from the constitution of the mind from which they flow./「<...>」 「<...>」 To attain an apprehension of the importance of this distinction 「let」⁽⁶⁾「us」 visit in imagination the proceedings of [a] 「some」 [popu- lous] metropolis./ Consider the multitude of human beings who inhabit it, &/ survey in thought the actions of the several classes into which they are/ divided. Their obvious actions are apparently uniform—the stabi/ lity of human society seems to be maintained [by ?inflexible] sufficiently/ by the uniformity of the conduct of [the] its members, both with/ regard to themselves & with regard to others. The [peasant<...>/ arises] labourer arises at a certain hour, & applies himself to/ [his] the task enjoined him. The [ministers] 「functionaries」 of government & [justice] 「justice」 「law」/ are regularly employed in their offices & courts. The trader holds/ a train of conduct from which he never deviates. The ministers/ of religion [hold] 「employ」 [a peculiar] 「[the] an accustomed」 language, & [conduct them] maintain/ a decent & equable regard. [The soldier has habits which he/ impose on] The army is drawn forth, the motions of every soldier/ are such as they were expected to be, the general commands/

& [the] his words are echoed from troop to troop.— The domestic/ actions of men, [?tak] are [undistin] for the most part undistin-/ -guishable one from the other, at a superficial glance./ [Marriage, friendship, education] The actions which are classed under/ the general appellation of [friend] marriage education friendship &c [resembl]/ are perpetually going on, & in [their] to a superficial glance are/ similar one to the other.—

[These are] But [the] [those w] if we would see the truth of things, they/ must be stripped of this fallacious appearance of uniformity./ In truth, no one action, has, when considered in its whole extent,/ [any resemblance to any other] an[y] essential resemblance with/ any other. Each individual who compos[ed]ing [the mas] [of] the 「vast」 multitude/ which we have been contemplating has 「a」 peculiar frame of/ mind which, [whet] whilst the [mass of his actions] the [great] features/ of the great mass of his actions remain uniform, impresses the/ minuter lineaments with its [own] peculiar hues. Thus [the]/[o] whilst [the whole] his life as a whole is like the lives of// (f. 194^v) other men, in detail it [differs] is most unlike, & the more [num] / subdivided the actions become, that is, the more they enter/ into that class which vitally influence 「have a vital inf.⁽⁹⁾」 on the happiness/ of others & his own, so much the more are they distinct from/ those of other men [so much] the [more ?profound] [The kind]/ “those little nameless unremembered acts/ Of kindness & of love” as well as those deadly outrages/ which are inflicted by a look, a word, or less—the very refraining/ from [the faintest expression of] some faint & 「most」 evanescent expression/ of countenance; these flow from a profounder source than/ [our habitual] the series of our habitual conduct[; & these &/ these are the s] which, it has been already said, derives its/ origin from without. [It] These are the actions, or such as/ these [(for] Altho' they are called minute [「a separate」], they are called so/ only in compliance with the blindness of those who/ cannot estimate their importance⁽¹⁰⁾] which make human life/ what it is.— [& It is not] & are the fountains of all the/ good & evil [so widely & so impartially] [by] 「with」 which its/ entire surface is so widely & impartially overspread.

[There are] [The surface of human of hum a affairs is all which the/ methods or <dimly> employed have been able to affect] [The multitude/ of their vain] Thus [from the summit of a lofty mountain, the Earth/ full of the labour & the habitations,] appears a vacant & uniform/ [plain— all the smaller elevations are levelled.] X/ [To give alms- is said to be a charitable action]

This is the difference between social & individual man. Not⁽¹¹⁾ [can he be

[divided]] 「that」 [is] this [definite] distinction is to be considered/ definite; or characteristic of one human being as com/ -pared with another: It denotes rather two classes of [actions] 「agency.」/ [which] any, [[one] human beings &] 「common, 「in a degree」 to which to」 every human being [is subjected/ to & divides the] [in some measure] [There is] none is exempt/ [from] the [contagion] indeed from [the empire of social] that species/ of influence which affects as it were the surface of his being, &/ gives the specific outline to his conduct. [All] Almost all that/ which is ostensible submits to that legislature [which is]/ created by the general representation of the past feelings/ of mankind— imperfect as it is from a variety of causes//
(f. 195r)

It is in the due appreciating the general effects of their peculiarities/ & in cultivating the habit of acquiring decisive knowledge/
X respecting the tendencies arising out of it, in particular cases/
XX that the most important [moral] part of moral science/
consists.

as it exists in [the] government the religion & the domestic habits [of/ mankind] [Those who do] not nominally, yet actually submit to/ the same power. The external features of their conduct indeed/ can no more escape it, than the clouds can escape from the/ stream of the wind. And his opinions—which he often hopes/ [But there is an] he has dispassionately secured from all contagion./ of prejudice & vulgarity—would be [found som] found on examination/ to be the the inevitably(*sic*) excrescence of the very usages from/ which he so [vehemently dissents] vehemently dissents. [「but」] Internally/ [I] [But internally all is otherwise]
all is [oth] conducted otherwise; the efficiency, the essence, the vitality/ [of actions depends on] derives its colour from what is no wise/ [conten] contributed to, from any external source.— Like the plant/ which derives [its] the accident of its [outward form] 「size & shape」 from the soil/ in which it springs, is cankered or distorted or [<...ed>] inflated, retains/ [its essential] those qualities which essentially divide it from all/ others, so that hemlock continues [poison] to be poison, & the violet/ does not cease to emit its odour, in whatsoever soil it 「may」 grow[s]

XX [It is the] [inner shine] 「deepest abyss」 of this vast & [mult damo] multitudinous/

cavern, [which] it is necessary that we should visit. [Truth lies at⁽¹²⁾ the bottom
of a well—.

We consider our own nature too superficially. We look on all that/ in ourselves
with which we can discover a resemblance in/ others; & consider those resemblances
as the materials of moral/ knowledge— It is in the differences that it actually consists.

[MS. Shelley d. 1]

(*f. 114^v rev.*) [There is one line of conduct, [to be] which every man]

[Of the two great subjects of enquiry]

[All enquireis(*sic*) respecting ⁽¹³⁾ $\lceil \langle \dots \text{ing} \rangle \rceil$ the portion of our/ nature which]

[The great] [most]

[There are two subjects of human enquiry, which [although]]

⁽¹⁴⁾ That great science which regards the nature & the [actions] $\lceil \text{operations} \rceil$ / of the
human mind, is popularly divided into/ Morals & Metaphysics. The [former] $\lceil \text{latter} \rceil$
relates to a/ just classification, & the assignment of [just/ n] distinct names to its
[objects] $\lceil \text{ideas} \rceil$; the former regards/ simply [such an arbitrary] $\lceil \text{the determination}$
of that \rceil arrangement of them/ [as may produce] which produces the greatest &/ most
solid happiness. It is admitted that a/ virtuous or moral action, is that action which/
when considered in all its accessories & consequences/ $\lceil \text{is fitted to} \rceil$ produce[s] the
highest pleasure to the greatest/ number of sensitive beings. The laws according/ to
which [this] $\lceil \text{all} \rceil$ pleasure, [ought] since it cannot be/ equally felt by all sensitive beings,
ought to be// (*f. 114^r rev.*) distributed by a voluntary agent is reserved for/ Chap.()

The [object] design of this little treatise is $\lceil \text{restricted} \rceil$ to the/ developement of \rceil
the elementary principles of morals.—

[It is] As far as regards that purpose [moral/ science will be regarded $\lceil \text{treated}$
principally \rceil as a source of positive]/ $\langle \text{S or I} \rangle$ metaphysical science $\lceil \text{will be treated}$
merely so far \rceil as a source of negative/ truth; [that is it will be employed] whilst
morality/ will be considered as a science [which ena] respecting/ which we can arrive
at positive conclusions./ [Metaphysics] [The principal direct service] of/ [metaphysical
discussion in the elucidation/ of morality, is to ascertain what is not/ true]

The [perverse] $\lceil \text{misguided} \rceil$ imaginations of men have rendered/ the firm ascertain-
ing of what is not true the/ principal direct service which metaphysical/ enquiry^x can

bestow upon moral science./ Moral science itself is the doctrine of/ the [conduct] 「voluntary actions」 of man as a [social be] sentient/ & social being. These actions depend upon the/ thoughts in his mind. [It is to discover] 「But [before] there is a mass⁽⁶⁶⁾/ of popular [<...>] 「opinion」, from which the most [important]/ enlightened persons are seldom wholly free, [which] 「into the truth⁽⁶⁷⁾」// (*f. 113^a rev.*) [the radical] falsehood [& imposture] of which, [it is the]/ it is incumbent upon us to enquire before we/ can arrive at any firm conclusions as to the/ conduct which we ought to pursue in the/ regulation of our own minds, or towards our/ fellow beings; or before we can ascertain the/ elementary laws according to which those/ thoughts from which these actions flow are/ originally combined—.

(*A space of 5-6 lines.*)

It is an axiom in mental philosophy, that we/ can think of nothing which we have not perceived./ When 「it is⁽⁶⁸⁾」 I say we can think of nothing, I/ mean, we can imagine nothing, we can reason/ of nothing, we can remember nothing, we/ can foresee nothing. The most astonishing combin/ ations of poetry, the subtlest deductions of/ logic & mathematics, are no other than combin/ ations which the intellect makes of sensations/ according to its own laws. [Any person]

A catalogue of all the [actions] thoughts of// (*f. 113^r rev.*) the mind, & of all their possible modifications is/ an [en]cyclopedic history of the Universe.—

But it will be [urged] objected, the inhabitants/ of the various planets of this & of other solar/ systems; & the existence of [the] a Power bearing/ the same relation to all that we perceive & are/ as what we call a cause does to what/ we call effect, were never objects of sensation, &/ yet the laws of mind 「almost universally」 suggest according to/ the various disposition of each a conjecture/ a persuasion, or a conviction of their existence.

[Undoubtedly] The reply is simple; these thoughts/ are also to be included in the catalogue/ of existence; 「they are modes in which [intellect] thoughts are combin- ed」 the objection only adds force/ to the conclusion, that beyond the limits/ of perception & of thought nothing can exist.

Thoughts, or ideas, or notions, call them what/ you will, differ from each other not in kind, but/ in force. It has commonly been supposed/ that those 「distinct」 thoughts which affect a number/ of persons, [during] [and during] 「at」 in [the] 「regular」 intervals/ [of] 「during」 the passage of a multitude of other thoughts,/ <[th] or &> which are called [real] 「real or」 external objects,/ are of totally different in kind

from those// (*f. 112^o rev.*) which affect only a few persons, & which recur at/ irregular intervals, & are usually more obscure &/ indistinct, such as hallucinations, dreams, & the/ ideas of madness. [This] 「No essential¹ distinction [<...>] [is not] 「between any one of these ideas or any class of them⁽²⁾ 「is⁽²⁾ founded/ on a[n] 「correct¹ observation of the nature of things, but/ merely on a consideration of what thoughts are/ most [frequen] [<...>] invariably subservient to the/ security & happiness of life; & if nothing more/ were expressed by the distinction, the philosopher/ might safely accomodate his language to that/ of the vulgar. But they 「pretend to¹ assert an essential/ difference which has no foundation in truth,/ & which suggests a[n] narrow & false [idea] con/ ception of 「universal¹ nature, the parent of the most/ fatal errors [both] in Speculation.—A[n essential/ difference between one thought] specific difference/ between every thought of the mind, is indeed/ a necessary consequence of that law by which it/ perceives diversity & number, but a generic/ or essential difference, is wholly [arbitrary]. The/ principle of [their] 「the¹ agreement, & [⁽²⁾<the..>] similarity/ of all [ideas] thoughts, is that they are thoughts;/ [the] the principle of their disagreement [is, the/ v] consists in the variety & irregularity of the// (*f. 112^o rev.*) occasions on which they [offer themselves to] 「arise in the mind—¹ the/ mind. That in which they agree, to that in which/ they [disagree] 「differ¹ is as everything to Nothing. Important/ distinctions, [ind] of various degrees of force indeed, are/ to be established between them, if [they were/ <...>] [they ?even] 「as they may be¹ subjects of ethical 「or œconomical¹ discussion./ But that is altogether a [distinct] question alto/ gether distinct.

[An illustration][By considering all ideas as]

[By considering nature]

[By] ?By considering all [ideas or <...>] knowledge/ as bounded by perception whose operations may/ be indefinitely combined; [by considering] we arrive/ at a conception of [the Universe] 「[<...>] Nature¹ inexpressibly/ more magnificent(*sic*), simple, & true, than [<...> <...y>] 「<accord...>¹/ usual [narrow system of metaphy] ordinary/ [modes] 「systems⁽²⁾ of complicated & partial consideration/ Nor does a contemplation of the Universe/ [as one whole] in this comprehensive & synthe/ tical view, exclude the subtlest analysis of/ its modifications & parts.

(*f. 111^o rev.*) A [graduated] 「scale¹ might be formed [of] 「[according to [one] the standard of¹] 「graduated according to the degrees of¹ 「a combined ratio¹ intensity, duration,/ connexion, 「periods of¹ recurrence, & utility [according to] 「on⁽²⁾ which/

[all ideas might be measured.] [might] 「would」 be the standard;/ [of all] according to which all ideas might be measured;/ and an uninterrupted chain of nicely shadowed/ distinction would be observed from the faintest/ [optical] impression 「on the senses」 to the 「most distinct」 [colours of the rainbow,]/ [from] [flow the <...>] combination of those impressions; [whe]/ firm⁽²⁸⁾ [those] 「the simplest of those」 combinations to that mass of knowledge/ which constitutes 「including our own nature」 what we call the universe.

(The lower half page is left blank.)

(f. 110^r rev.) [By the irresistible laws of [our own] mind, [we are]]/ We are 「intuitively」 conscious of our own existence, and of that/ 「connexion in the」 train of 「our」 successive ideas [by] which we term our/ identity— We are conscious 「also」 of the existence of/ other minds; but not intuitively. [It is the/ result] [Our conviction belongs simply] Our evidence/ with respect to the existence of other minds/ is founded upon [the] a very complicated relation/ of ideas, which it is foreign to [our] present/ purpose 「of this treatise」 to anatomise. The basis of this relation/ is undoubtedly, a periodical recurrence of [ideas/ of the same nature] Masses of ideas which [by]/ our own 「voluntary」 determination, have, in one peculiar/ direction, no power to circumscribe or to arrest,/ & against the recurrence of which they can 「only」 im-/ perfectly provide.— [I] [We are] The irresistable(*sic*) law,/ of thought [compel us, to] constrain us to believe/ that the [precise] limits of 「our」 actual [thought] 「ideas」/ are not the actual limits of possible [thoughts] 「ideas」/ [<...>] the law according to which these/ [inferences] 「deductions」 are drawn, is called analogy; &/ this is the foundation of all our [reasoning] 「?inferences」, // (f. 109^o rev.) from one idea to another [?founded] inasmuch as they/ resemble each other. (*The rest of the page is left blank.*)

(f. 2^r) [The reflecting]/ It is possible to concieve(*sic*) a system of forms/ less imperfect than that according to/ which [Society] human society is actually/ administered.—

The object of the forms 「according to which human Society is administered」 is the hap-/ -piness of the individuals composing the/ communities which they regard, & these⁽²⁸⁾ forms/ are perfect or imperfect in proportion/ [as they] to the degree in which they/ promote this [object] end.

This object is not merely the/ quantity of happiness enjoyed by/ [those] [sensitive] individuals as sensitive/ beings, but the mode in which/ it [is] 「should be」 distributed among them, as/ social beings. It is not enough,/ [that some] if such a coincidence/

can be concieved(*sic*) of as possible, that/ one person or class of persons, should/ enjoy
[great happin] the highest happiness// (*f. 2^o*) Whilst another [suffers proportionate
misery—/ It is necessary that] ⁽⁸⁰⁾「is suffering a disproportionate」 degree of misery./ [even
although the <m...><...><...>] / It is necessary that [it] 「material happiness produced
by the common efforts, & preserved by the common care」 should be/ distributed according
to the just/ claims of each individual; if/ not, although the quantity produced/ should
be the same, the end of/ society would remain <?unfullfilled>./ The object is in
a compound proportion/ of the quantity of happiness produced/ & the [correctness]
「fitness」 「correspondence」 of the mode in/ which it is distributed, to the/ [Correlative
with these [sole] portions/ of the sole whole] 「elementary [<...>] of」 feelings of man as/
a social being」

The disposition in an individual/ to promote this object is called/ Virtue: & the
「The <...>」 [*tendenci.*] 「two」 constituent/ Of Virtue, [Justic] benevolence &/
Justice [may be consid] are correlative/ with these two portions of [its object.]/ the
[great object] only true object of/ all the voluntary actions of a human/ being.
Benevolence is the desire to/ be the author of good, & Justice the/ apprehension of
the manner in which/ good ought to be done.—

(*f. 3^o*) [In] [What] / [The common distinction] [moral & political/ science] Justice &
benevolence result/ from the elementary laws of the/ human mind. See Chap —/
—

Chap 2./ It is foreign to the 「general」 scope of this little/ Treatise to emcumber(*sic*)
[the] 「a simple」 argument/ [With] by controverting ⁽⁸¹⁾[with] any [other] of/ [theory on
the system of; but] of/ the trite objections [which] 「of」 habit or/[superstition have dictate
to vulgar/ sophist] 「fanaticism」 But there are two; [*<...>*]/ [om] [framed on the pers]
[connected with a/ predominance of those ideas by which/ Min] [*?misery*] [from poli-
tica] [one]/ the first the [ground] [*?Way*] basis/ of all [the] political [error] 「mistake」,
& the/ second, the prolific cause & effect/ of religious error, which [from the/ plausibility
they recieve(*sic*) from flattery]/ [the] it seems useful to [furnish]/ a[*<...>*] refute.

[Wherefore] 1st it is ?enquired &c (p 3.)

(*f. 3^o*) If he persists to enquire why he ought to [prom]/ promote the happiness
of mankind, & [on]/ [reflex] [impartial reflexion he can discern/ nothing in the
organization of his mind/ which an] 「he」 [requires] 「demands」 a mathematical/ or
metaphysical reason for a moral/ action, [He is in same situation as] 「The absurdity of
this scepticism would」 ⁽⁸²⁾「is more apparent but not less real than the [*<...>*] exacting」 ⁽⁸⁴⁾

of <...>/ [he would ?exact] a moral reason for/ a mathematical 「or metaphysician」
 fact. [He is like a/ Man who is not contented with it] 「with <rep...><...>」/ [being
 convinced] 「If any person should refuse to admyt」 that all the radii/ of a circle are of
 equal length, [&/ resists the clearest] or that human/ actions are necessarily determined/
 by [the] motives, until it could be/ proved that these [rig] radii & these/ actions
 uniformly tended to the/ production of the greatest general good/ who would not
 wonder at the unrea/ sonable & capricious association of his/ ideas? (Mark XX)

A common Sophism &c.// (f. 4^r) his personall advantage to the object [which he
 appar]/ rently 「obviously」⁶³ proposed. That men do so in some/ instances is possible,
 but the actions which/ are the result of such [an <...>] considerations/ will not fall
 within any imaginable/ definition of virtue.— [They will belong to/ the <...> class]/
 (5 words illegibly fading.)

The writer of a philosophical treatise/ may, I imagine, at this advanced era/ of
 human [reason] 「intellect」, be held excused from/ entering into a controversy with those/
 [if such] reasoners, if such there are,/ who would claim an exemption [from/ the] [in
 favour of any Intended systems]/ from its decrees in favour of any/ [system of ?reason
 religions] 「[of] one among」 [of] of/ those [sys] diversfied systems of 「obscure」 opinion/
 [which have been] respecting morals, which/ under the name of religions have in/
 various ages & countries obtained among/ mankind. [These reasoners pretend] 「Besides
 that」,/ [If as these <...>] [Yet] 「For」 if as these// (f. 4^v) [For] Yet if, as these/ rea-
 soners have pretended, [there is annexed/ to certain actions] eternal torture or/ happiness
 [is proposed] 「will ensue」 as the conseq/ uence of certain actions, [according/ to the
 will of the supreme Being if/ ?more] [it] we should [no manner be/ taught what] be no
 nearer the/ possession of a standard to determine/ what actions were right or wrong,/
 even if [these] [we] this pretended/ revelation <...> [communicated to/ us a catalogue of
 them; an] 「<...> which is by no means the case, had」 furnished/ us with a complete
 catalogue of/ them.— [The actions thus referred to/ might be virtuous or vicious,
 but]/ The character as [such] 「of actions, as virtuous or vicious,」 would by/ no means
 be determined alone by/ the personal advantage or disad/ vantage, of each [person]
 「moral agent」 individually/ considered. Indeed [these great] 「an action」⁶⁴/ is often virtu-
 ous in proportion to/ the greatness of the personal calamity// (f. 5^r) Which the author
 willingly draws upon himself by/ daring to perform it. It is because an action/
 produces an⁶⁵ [certain] overbalance of [happiness]/ or [ple] [misery] pleasure or pain to
 [the/ greatest number] sentient beings, & not merely/ because its consequences are

[evil to/ the indivi] beneficent or injurious to/ the author of that action; that it is/
good or evil. [He who does] Nay this/ latter consideration 'has a tendency to' pollute[s]
the purity/ of virtue, in as much as it consists/ in the motive rather than the con/
sequences of an action. A person/ who should labour for the happiness of/ mankind,
lest he should be tormented,/ eternally in hell, would [do no more/ than he who ac-
cepted a bribe to/ do his duty.] [It is a hire] [This/ virtue 'action'⁽³⁹⁾ would be in the
same relations/ to that of a person] 'With reference to that motive,'⁽³⁹⁾ [have] 'possess'
as little/ claim to the epithet of virtuous, as/ he who should torture imprison &/[<....>
them] & burn them alive, [the] a/ more [common] 'usual' & natural consequences//
(f. 5^v) of such principles, for the sake of the/ enjoyment of Heaven.—

[If a reasoner]

[If] [po] [political]

[If a band ['a robber'] of robbers attack my/ carriage, & whilst some are
engaged/ in rifling my baggage, others, declare/ with blunderbusses at my head/
that if I make the slightest motion/ they will blow [my] out my brains,/ no one will
imagine they laid/ down a moral precept.—/ [If an earthly <..> governor] [makes]
'may publish'/ a proclamation that all persons/ shall [refrain] perform, or refrain
from/ a certain action, or [<..>] 'incur the penalty' to/ imprisonment or death;
[no one/ will imagine that this proclamation/ is a moral precept—] But no/ person
considers the contents of this proclamation [?is impera/ tive]]

(f. 6^r) [If] [an individual stronger] 'My neighbour' presuming on his/ strength,
[dictates] 'may' direct me to [refrain] perform/ or to refrain from a particular action;/
indicating ['under'⁽⁴⁰⁾] a certain arbitrary penalty in the/ event of disobedience within
his power to/ inflict. [If indeed] My action if modified/ by his menaces can in no
degree partici/ pate [of] 'in' virtue. He has afforded me no/ critetion as to what is
right or wrong./ [If] A King or an assembly of men may/ [The oppressors of my
country] [may]/ publish a proclamation [declaring that]/ affixing any penalty to any
particular action/ [but] [that act is not immoral because/ the penalty is affixed] If/
(A space of 5-6 lines.)/ Nothing is more evident than [inasmuch/ as a person] 'that
the epithet of virtue is inapplicable/ to the' refraining from [the performance/ of]
that action [from] on account of the/ evil arbitrarily attached to it. If the/ action is
in itself beneficial, virtue/ would rather consist 'not in refraining from it, but'⁽⁴¹⁾ in
firmly defying// (f. 6^v) the personal consequences attached to its/ performance.

[If] Some usurper of supernatural energy/ [should] 'might' subdue the whole

globe to his/ power; he might possess new & unheard/ of resources for [torturing mankind]/ induing [the torments with] [“making the ?punis”] his punishments/ with the most terrible attributes of pain./ [They might be intense in their] The/ [sufferings] “torments” of his victims might be intense/ in their degree, & protracted to an/ infinite duration. Still, the “will of/ the lawgiver” would afford no surer/ criterion as to what actions were/ right or wrong. It would only increase/ the possible virtue of these(*sic*) who, refusing/ to [acknow] become the instruments of his[// (*A page is torn off after this.*)

Notes on the Transcript

*Throughout the transcript, ([]) immediately after ([]) indicates that insertions are written over cancellations, unless otherwise stated.

- (1) “instrumental... called”: *written below* [is called benevolence]
- (2) “virtue”: *written over* [benevolence]
- (3) “men”: *written below* we
- (4) suffering... “of others”: *later insertion.*
- (5) It is... each other]: *later insertion.*
- (6) have... torpid: *later insertion.*
- (7) the: *altered from* that
- (8) “let”: *written below* distinction
- (9) “have a vital inf.”: *written below* vitally influence
- (10) [(for] Altho’... importance): *deleted with one vertical line in the middle.*
- (11) Not: *altered from* Nor
- (12) [Truth lies at]: *probably not deleted, but only underlined.*
- (13) “<...ing>”: *written over* [the portion]
- (14) That: *altered from* The
- (15) “ideas”: *written below* [objects]
- (16) “But... mass”: *written below* [It is to discover]
- (17) “into the truth”: *written below* [which]
- (18) I: *altered from* we
- (19) the: *written on* <S..>
- (20) “between any one of these”: *written over* [<...>] [is not]; “ideas...them”: *written below* [This] distinction
- (21) “is”: *written below* [is not]
- (22) & : *written on* is
- (23) “systems”: *written below* [modes]
- (24) “on”: *written below* [according to]
- (25) firm: *for* from(?)
- (26), (27) the: *altered from* this
- (28) these: *altered from* they
- (29) This: *altered from* That

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- 30 'is suffering... disproportionate': *written over* [suffers proportionate misery—]
- 31 *controverting*: *altered from* controversy
- 32 the: *altered from* this
- 33 'The absurdity... would': *written over* [He is in... as]
- 34 'is more... exacting': *written below* [He is in... as]
- 35 'obviously': *written over* [appar]
- 36 'an action': *written below* [those great]
- 37 an: *altered from* a
- 38 'action': *written over* [virtue]
- 39 'With reference... motive': *written below* [It is a hire] [This]
- 40 ['under']: *written below* indicating
- 41 'not... but': *written on the left-hand margin*.

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