A Study of Speech and Thought Representation Model Proposed by Fludernik (1993): With Special Reference to Japanese

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1 Introduction

This study has two purposes, one is to modify the discussion on Japanese speech and thought representation in Fludernik (1993), and the other is to examine the applicability of Fludernik’s schematic language representation model to Japanese.

In referring to the basic modes of speech and thought representation, the terms, direct discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse are used in the present paper. This is based on the terminology of Fludernik (1993), in which the three are typically illustrated as below:

(1) Direct discourse: (Tom said:) Gosh, I am tired.
(2) Indirect discourse: Tom said that he was tired.
(3) Free indirect discourse: Gosh, he was tired (Tom said).^{2}

(Fludernik 1993: 74. Original emphases)

The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, I will modify the discussion on Japanese speech and thought representation in Fludernik (1993), and in Section 3, I will discuss the applicability of Fludernik’s schematic language representation model to Japanese. Section 4 will conclude the paper by summarising the discussions.

2 Modifications to the discussions on Japanese in Fludernik (1993)

2.1 Contributions of Fludernik (1993)

The Fictions of Language and the Languages of Fiction (1993) by Monika Fludernik was described by Brian McHale as a “landmark contribution to the poetics of narrative”. It provides an extensive discussion on speech and thought representation with its focus on free indirect discourse. This is important in two senses. Firstly it is the first book-length
refutation of Ann Banfield's *Unspeakable Sentences* (1982). Despite its rigorous and often inflexible nature, the theoretically-minded research of Banfield's has held sway over competing theories. It would not be exaggerating to say that the development of research on free indirect discourse in the 1980s has been achieved mainly through a series of evaluations of Banfield's work. However, most of the major critical discussions were presented in the form of an article rather than in a longer form (McHale 1983, Yamaguchi, H 1989, for example). Fludernik (1993) is therefore the first substantial contribution to the research on free indirect discourse since Banfield (1982) with the possible exception of Ehrlich (1990), which did not confront Banfield in any essential sense.

Secondly, Fludernik has provided linguistic data from a much wider corpus to clarify the various aspects of free indirect discourse both diachronically and synchronically.

Diachronically, the nineteenth century literature and texts before that, including medieval texts have been incorporated into the corpus. The former has provided a standard corpus to those researchers who follow the traditional line of approach (cf. Pascal 1977, Ullmann 1957), but it has been deliberately excluded from the main discussion in Banfield (1982) and Ehrlich (1990). Fludernik’s inclusion of these texts therefore is to be especially noted.

Synchronically, linguistic data from different genres and languages have been included, whereas much of the preceding research, especially that written in English, dealt mainly with English (and possibly French) literary texts. Fludernik expands her corpus to spoken discourse and non-literary written discourse, and typologically to other Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages, such as German, Russian and Japanese.

2.2 General Problems of Fludernik's discussions on Japanese

Fludernik’s inclusion of linguistic phenomena in Japanese into her discussion can lead to a wider accountability of her schematic language representation model, and this should be welcomed in its own right. However, her discussions on Japanese speech and thought representation seemingly have two drawbacks. One is that they have failed to accommodate recent accounts on the subject, some of which are substantial in nature. The other is that they have suffered from some rather unfortunate and perhaps accidental mistakes or misunderstandings in the treatment of the quoted examples of the Japanese language.

Fludernik admits that although she has “appended a note on speech and thought representation in Russian or Japanese, [she has] had to leave any extensive account pending until more fully qualified research is undertaken” (11). Yet she explains the relevance of the references to these languages by saying that “[her] excursion to the East is motivated
by necessary realization that many things that we [sic.] take for granted in relation to speech and thought representation can be handled quite differently in other Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages" (100). It is true that Japanese deals with speech and thought representation "quite differently" when compared to English, for instance. However, it could have been dealt with in such a way that the similarities, as well as the differences, could be clarified between English and Japanese. The following sections will re-examine Fludernik's discussions on Japanese speech and thought representation. For the sake of comparison I will refer mainly to English.

2.3 Direct and indirect discourse in Japanese

2.3.1 "Ambiguity" between direct and indirect discourse in Japanese

Fludernik's brief explanation of Japanese speech and thought representation system starts by pointing out the following three characteristics.

(4) In Japanese there is no clear syntactic difference between direct and indirect discourse.

(5) Both [direct and indirect discourse] can be formed by means of a quotational clause that has the quotational suffix -to.

(6) Indirectness appears only where the -to clause contains pronouns, names, lexems or expressions that cannot be read as direct quotation.

(Fludernik 1993: 102)

Among these characteristics, (6) does not reflect the linguistic reality in Japanese, and needs some modification. Before describing the modification, I will discuss what characteristics of Japanese speech and thought representation are actually reflected in an observation such as (4).

The observation that there is no clear syntactic difference between direct and indirect discourse in Japanese often reflects the difficulty of deciding whether an instance of reported speech or thought is direct discourse or indirect discourse. These "ambiguous" cases, as I call them, have been discussed in the preceding literature on Japanese speech and thought representation such as Maynard (1984), but the emphasis in my following discussion is on the comparison between Japanese and English, and the discussion is organised so that it will clarify the similarities as well as the differences between the two languages.

There are two types of ambiguous cases. Firstly in some cases, a sentence can be
read both as direct or indirect discourse, the meaning of the sentence being different in each case. The other is the case when a sentence is read in a certain way, and at the same time it is still possible to assume it to be either direct or indirect discourse. However, these two types of ambiguous cases are in fact not unique to Japanese. English can actually produce sentences of these types. The difference is that the English syntactic rules make it more difficult for the ambiguous sentences to appear. I will elaborate each type of ambiguity in turn. It should be noted that in the following discussion, the focus is on the “syntactic difference” between direct and indirect discourse, and typographical features such as quotation marks and commas marking the reported speech in direct discourse are treated in a way which highlights the discussion on the syntactic difference. Hence the round brackets around the comma in some examples. In other words, if the distinction relies on typographical features, then there is no clear syntactic distinction.

First, consider the following example of Japanese which can be read in two ways:

(7) Goroo wa watasi ga tadasii to itta³.
Goro/TOP/I/NOM/be right/QUOT/said

(7) can be read both as direct discourse and as indirect discourse and the following two readings are possible:

(8) Direct discourse reading: I=Goro (=Goro said, “I am right.”)
(9) Indirect discourse reading: I=the speaker of the whole sentence (=Goro said that I was right.)

In the direct discourse reading, Goro is taken for the referent of the first person pronoun *watasi*, while in the indirect discourse reading, the speaker of the whole sentence is taken for the referent.

However, this type of ambiguity is not unique to Japanese speech and thought representation. If we take atypical examples into consideration, a similar phenomenon is also observed in English. Consider the next sentence:

(10) Andy said (,) I was right.

If we take (10) as the transcription of an utterance rather than a part of written discourse which would use typographical markers and would be generally more obedient to the
grammatical rules such as the use of the subordinate conjunction *that*, the next two readings are possible.

(11) Direct discourse reading: I = Andy (= Andy said, "I was right.")
(12) Indirect discourse reading: I = the speaker of the whole sentence (= Andy said that I was right.)

The referent of *I* can be either Andy as in (11) or the speaker of the whole sentence as in (12). Both direct and indirect readings are possible for (10), confirming that English does indeed allow this type of ambiguity.

One thing to be noticed is that the English example discussed above is atypical because it is based on the assumption that the subordinate conjunction *that* is no less obligatory in indirect discourse than typographical markers are in direct discourse. In other words, typical sentences of direct and indirect discourse in English will not allow the ambiguity.

Now let us consider the other type of ambiguous speech and thought representation. First, consider the following Japanese example:

(13) Goroo wa tukareteiru to itta.
    Goro/TOP/be tired/QUOT/said

More than one meaning can be attributed to the sentence. The most accessible reading may be:

(14) Goro said, "I am tired"/Goro said that he was tired.

where the person who is tired is Goro, but another reading is possible. Consider a situation such as the following.

(15) “Where is Yoko? I thought she was coming to the party, too.”
    “Oh, she is not coming. Goro said, ‘she is tired’/Goro said that she was tired.”

Since the person who is being talked about in the reply in (15) is clear, if the conversation is in Japanese, it is possible not to mention Yoko explicitly by name and to use (13).

Now, let us confine ourselves to the first reading of (13). I gave both direct and
indirect discourse versions of English in (14) because it is not possible to decide whether (13) is direct or indirect discourse even when the meaning is fixed. The following (16), (17) and (18) can be used to convey the same meaning.

(16) Goroo wa watasi wa tukareteiru to itta.

Goro/TOP/I/TOP/be tired/QUOT/said

(17) Goroo wa kare wa tukareteiru to itta.

Goro/TOP/he/TOP/be tired/QUOT/said

(18) Goroo wa, zibun wa tukareteiru to itta.

Goro/TOP/self/TOP/be tired/QUOT/said

When the meaning is fixed as (14), *watasi* “I” in (16) refers to Goro and (16) is direct discourse. Similarly *kare* in (17) and *zibun* in (18) refer to Goro and (17) and (18) are indirect discourse. That all (13), (16), (17) and (18) can convey the same meaning (14) means that (13) cannot be decided either as direct or indirect discourse.

This second type of ambiguity is also found in English if atypical examples are taken into consideration. Consider the following examples:

(19) Andy says (,) the recommended dictionary is good.

Let us attribute to (19) the meaning and the context as below:

(20) Someone recommends a dictionary to Andy. He finds it a good dictionary and tells this to other people. A friend of Andy reports what he says about the dictionary to another friend.

As the reporting clause in (19) is in the present tense and there is no personal pronoun to serve as a marker, there is no syntactic clue to tell whether it is direct or indirect discourse. The following two examples can be used to convey the same meaning as (19):

(21) Andy says (,) the dictionary I was recommended is good.

(22) Andy says (,) the dictionary he was recommended is good.

When the meaning is fixed, both the referent of *I* in (21) and the referent of *he* in (22) are Andy, and (21) is direct discourse and (22) is indirect discourse. As (19), (21) and (22) con-
vey the same meaning, it can be said that it is impossible to tell whether (19) is direct or indirect discourse. Again it must be noted that atypical examples without the subordinate conjunction that have to be chosen in this argument, which implies that typical indirect discourse can avoid this ambiguity.

In conclusion, in this sub-subsection I have discussed the following points concerning the comment of Fludernik on syntactic differences between direct and indirect discourse (4). Firstly, it is true that the syntactic difference between direct and indirect discourse in Japanese is not clear in some instances. There are instances, however, where the syntactic difference between direct and indirect discourse is not clear in English if we take atypical examples without the subordinate conjunction that into consideration. Considering that atypical indirect discourse has to be chosen in English, it seems that English has a system which typically produces less ambiguous cases.

In the next sub-subsection, I will elaborate the behaviour of syntactic and deictic features in direct and indirect discourse in Japanese and modify Fludernik’s explanation (6).

2.3.2 Direct and indirect discourse in Japanese

The characteristics of typical direct and indirect discourse in English will be simplified as follows (Fludernik 1993: 74):

Direct discourse

(23) Direct discourse example: (Tom said:) Gosh, I am tired.

(24) Direct discourse characteristic 1: Grammatically independent sentences

(25) Direct discourse characteristic 2: Deictically grounded in the ‘here and now’ of the enunciation

Indirect discourse

(26) Indirect discourse: Tom said that he was tired.

(27) Indirect discourse characteristic 1: Introductory verbal phrase

(28) Indirect discourse characteristic 2: Subordinate speech and thought representation clause

In English the difference between direct and indirect discourse is marked by (24), (25), (27) and (28). In Japanese, (24) and (28) are not as explicit as in English. Characteristic (27) does not occur in Japanese. This leaves only (25) that behaves in a similar way in both languages. Consider:
(29) Kinoo Yooko wa asita berurin e tatu to itta.
yesterday/Yoko/TOP/tomorrow/Berlin/to/leave/QUOT/said

As is the case with (7), the reported clause “asita berurin e tatu” can be read in both ways. It can be read either as (30) or (31):

(30) *asita*= the day after the day of Yoko’s enunciation (=Yesterday Yoko said “I am leaving for Berlin tomorrow.”)

(31) *asita*= day after the enunciation of the whole sentence (=Yesterday Yoko said that she would leave for Berlin tomorrow.)

Thus, deictic expressions grounded in the “here and now” of the reported speaker are characteristic of direct discourse both in English and Japanese.

The other three characteristics (24), (27) and (28) are concerned with the syntactic distinction between direct and indirect discourse. In English indirect discourse is marked by such features as the introductory subordinate conjunction, the syntactic structure, the concordance of tense and of person. Some of these are observed in Japanese, but others are less frequently or never observed. In Japanese the concordance of tense in indirect speech does not take place, and the concordance of person functions as a less explicit marker because personal pronouns are frequently absent when the context allows the inference, both of which are rightly pointed out in Fludernik (119, 185).

The syntactic difference between subordinate and independent clauses, or more specifically between direct and indirect discourse appears in different ways: it appears not as a difference in the word order, for instance, but as a restriction to the particles and other features that can occur in the clause. For example, in Japanese, the communicative mood of the original speech is regarded as one of the most important distinctions in the latest accounts on Japanese speech and thought representation. The communicative mood is the hearer-oriented mood of the original speaker and it refers to the original speaker’s attitude toward the person to whom the original speech or thought is addressed. A figurative addressee such as the speaker him/herself or the implied reader of a text is included in the addressee. The communicative mood is frequently conveyed in Japanese explicitly with sentence final particles *wa, yo, no, ne, na, zo*, etc. or polite endings *desu, masu*, etc. The presence of the original speaker’s mood marks a reported clause as direct discourse. The following sentences are read solely as direct discourse.
(32) Goroo wa watasi ga tadasii desu to itta.
    Goro/TOP/I/NOM/be right/POL/QUOT/said
(33) Goroo wa watasi ga tadasii yo to itta.
    Goro/TOP/I/NOM/be right/PAR/QUOT/said

The only possible reading of (32) and (33) is to take “Goro=watasi” because it is direct discourse with the communicative mood of the original speaker. Thus it can be said that in Japanese indirect discourse is marked by the lack of the communicative mood of the original speaker. However, the problem is that the communicative mood of the original speaker is not always explicit even if it is present. Let us come back to the following example:

(34) Goroo wa watasi ga tadasii to itta.
    Goro/TOP/I/NOM/be right/QUOT/said

Neither the polite form endings nor the sentence final particles are obligatory markers of the communicative mood, and it is possible that we assume that the reported clause in (34) has the original speaker’s (=Goro’s) mood just as (32) or (33) does. We can also assume that there is no indication of Goro’s mood in the reported clause of (34) and read it as indirect discourse.

To sum up, on the one hand, the presence of the explicit markers of the original speaker’s mood automatically determines the direct discourse reading of the reported clause. The absence of the explicit markers, on the other, does not indicate whether the reported discourse is direct discourse or indirect discourse.

The communicative mood discussed here is apparently similar to what Fludernik argues is conveyed by the “addressee-oriented” expressions such as “sir”, “honestly”, “you know”, “excuse me” and so on (1993: 233-235).

Consider the possible readings:

(35) Andy says (.) I don’t understand what you mean.
(36) Andy says (.) honestly (.) I don’t understand what you mean.

While both direct discourse reading (I=Andy) and indirect discourse reading (I=the speaker of the whole sentence) are available in (35), only the direct discourse reading is possible in (36) if the addressee-oriented expression “honestly” is to be conveyed as a part
of the reported speech.

To discuss the difference between the communicative mood in Japanese and the addressee-oriented expressions in English is beyond the scope of this paper. It can be seen from the discussions above that they are concerned with similar aspects of speech and thought representation.

2.3.3 Interim summary

The following table shows what marks the difference between direct and indirect discourse in English and Japanese:

Table: Markers of direct and indirect discourse in English and Japanese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>deictic expressions</strong></td>
<td>○ can be missing</td>
<td>○ can be missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>concordance of tense</strong></td>
<td>○</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>concordance of person</strong></td>
<td>○ can be missing</td>
<td>○ frequently missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>addressee-oriented expressions/ original speaker’s mood</strong></td>
<td>○ can be non-explicit</td>
<td>○ can be non-explicit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deictic expressions mark the difference between direct and indirect discourse in both languages, even though the concordance of tense does so only in English. Theoretically, the concordance of person is another marker, but Japanese often shows no personal pronouns. The addressee-oriented expressions and the original speaker’s communicative mood distinguish direct discourse from indirect discourse in both languages, although in either language, it is not always explicitly present and its apparent absence does not indicate the indirectness of the discourse.

Now, if we look back at (6), where Fludernik writes, “indirectness in fact appears only where the to-clause contains pronouns, names, lexems or expressions that cannot be read as direct quotation” (Fludernik 1993: 102), we can see that it misleadingly defines indirect discourse as marked whereas it assumes that direct discourse is unmarked.
2.4 Grammatical distinction versus stylistic variation in Japanese speech and thought representation

2.4.1 “Quasi-direct discourse” in Japanese

After the brief discussion of speech and thought representation in Japanese based on Maynard (1984), Fludernik (1993) moves on to the discussion of “quasi-direct discourse” as proposed by Kuno (1986). That Kuno’s quasi-direct discourse is discussed again in Subsection 8.4 shows that Fludernik finds this category relevant to the schematic language representation model. In fact she writes that she finds the Japanese examples discussed in Kuno (1986) “enlightening”, apparently because they correspond with her idea of the process of typification (424). However, it is not clearly explained why and how quasi-direct discourse is relevant to the model. Furthermore, some unfortunate confusion in the interpretation and explanation of the quoted Japanese makes the significance and the relevance of the Japanese phenomenon less visible. Therefore in this sub-subsection I will clarify this point by establishing the distinction between the grammatical category and the stylistic variation in Japanese speech and thought representation.

The example quoted by Fludernik from Kuno (1986) is as follows:

(37) Hanako ga [kanozyo no ie ni ‘sugu koi’] to denwa o kakete kita.  
‘Hanako called me up and said that (lit.) “Come right now” to her house.’

(Kuno 1986, quoted Fludernik 1993: 103)

Kuno states that sugu koi is “quasi-direct discourse”. It is “direct” because it is imperative, but it is “quasi” because it cannot be the verbatim transcription of what Hanako, a female speaker, said. He also argues that kanozyo no ie ni ‘sugu koi’ is blended quasi-direct discourse because kanozyo is the third person female pronoun and refers to Hanako. I will not commit myself to the analysis of “blended quasi-direct discourse” as such, because it is “quasi-direct discourse” that is relevant to Fludernik’s discussion. However, it should be pointed out here that the imperative does not warrant the direct discourse reading, and the whole of the reported clause kanozyo no ie ni sugu koi can be taken as indirect discourse.

Based on Kuno’s discussion, Fludernik argues that “the imperative form used [=koi] is not the expected one (i.e. the conventionally polite imperative) but the basic (impolite or familiar) imperative form” and that “[1]n the original speech act this impolite imperative could not have been employed” (103). This argument of Fludernik assumes that there is an original speech to which the reported speech in question should and can be compared. Is it
not this assumption what Fludernik, using Meir Sternberg's term, calls the "direct speech fallacy" or "the mistaken (ingrained) belief that direct discourse is in every sense of the word primary and originary to other types of quotation" (281, original italics)? Given the sentence (37), we cannot know if Hanako is rude enough to use "sugu koi" or not. Actually we do not know what kind of person Hanako is, and if we argue that it is not relevant because this is a hypothetical linguistic discussion, how can we decide that it is not verbatim when the original speech itself is hypothetical? Actually it is by discarding this direct discourse fallacy that Fludernik develops her idea of the schematic language representation. Therefore, Japanese speech and thought representation needs to be discussed in the same way, that is, discussed without the direct speech fallacy if we attempt to apply the schematic language representation model to Japanese.

In the next section I will elaborate on the underlying direct discourse fallacy in such categories as quasi-direct discourse. First, however, one modification should be added to Fludernik's discussion on "quasi-direct discourse", because an unfortunate mistake in the quoted Japanese example adds unnecessary confusion to the discussion. Referring to the quasi-direct discourse example (37), she writes, "[a] more realistic verbatim transcription of Hanako's words would have been something like 'watakusi no ie ni wa sumimasen ga mo konaide kudasai'—with the apology (sumimasen ga) and the polite request form konaide kudasai." (103). The verbatim version shown here literally means "I'm sorry, but please do not come to my house any more" and even the notoriously complex Japanese pragmatics would not let one infer the illocutionary meaning of "come right now" from this sentence. As the same Japanese example is quoted in another page (424) and matched correctly with an English translation, I assume that the paraphrase here is an accidental mistake, which nevertheless adds to confusion in discussion.

2.4.2 Stylistic variation in Japanese speech and thought representation

In the last sub-subsection I argued that "quasi-direct discourse" is based on the direct discourse fallacy and that it is necessary to discuss Japanese speech and thought representation beyond this fallacy. In this section I will point out that grammatical distinction and stylistic variation in Japanese speech and thought representation should be discussed separately. We can thus describe categories such as "quasi-direct discourse" in terms of stylistic variation.

Kuno (1986) is not the only attempt to establish some categories other than direct discourse and indirect discourse in Japanese. For example, Endo (1982) divides direct discourse into three subcategories and Kamada (1988) sets up "semi-direct discourse." All
these categories share the assumption that direct discourse is verbatim representation of the original speech. However, Kamada’s “semi-direct discourse” needs special mention here, for it shows some inclination to a stylistic approach, even though he has not put it in so many words. He introduces the idea of “dramatic effect” and argues that direct discourse conveys the dramatic effect of the original utterance, while “semi-direct discourse” lacks the dramatic effect. Kamada’s discussion of the idea of dramatic effect has its limitation in that it is based on the direct discourse fallacy, but on the other hand, it fully reflects the reader’s intuitive response to various examples of reported speech. Compare the following two instances:

(38) Hanako ga sugu kitekudasai to denwa o kakete kita.
    Hanako/NOM/immediately/please come/QUOT/telephone/ACC/call/came
(39) Hanako ga sugu koi to denwa o kakete kita.
    Hanako/NOM/immediately/come-IMP/QUOT/telephone/ACC/call/came

In the last sub-subsection, I have criticised the analysis that would take (38) for a “verbatim” rendering of the “original” utterance and (39) for non-“verbatim” direct discourse or “quasi-direct discourse” by saying that it is based on the direct discourse fallacy. My point was that there is no grammatical difference between the two and both are direct discourse in terms of grammatical distinction between direct and indirect discourse. However, it is true that we perceive a stylistic difference between (38) and (39). (38) is likely to give the reader an impression that it is a faithful reproduction of Hanako’s speech, whereas (39) tends to give the reader the impression that some editorial modification by the reporting speaker may have been added to what Hanako must have said. Also consider the following:

(40) Hanako ga sugu kitekudasai ne to denwa o kakete kita.
    Hanako/NOM/immediately/please come-POL/LAR/QUOT/telephone/ACC/call/came
(41) Hanako ga sikyuu koi to denwa o kakete kita.
    Hanako/NOM/immediately/come-IMP/QUOT/telephone/ACC/call/came

The reader’s intuitive response to (40) will be similar to the one to (38), while the response to (41) will be similar to (39). However, we cannot tell which of (38) and (40) is closer to “verbatim direct discourse” nor can we tell whether both (39) and (41) are to be regarded
as “quasi-direct discourse”. My argument is therefore that there is stylistic variation among (38), (39), (40) and (41), all of which have more or less similar propositional content.

A series of Fujita’s analyses on speech and thought representation in Japanese have strongly emphasised the necessity of the distinction between the grammatical aspects and the stylistic or pragmatic aspects of speech and thought representation. For example, in his latest paper (Fujita 1995), he clearly distinguishes the grammatical and the pragmatic and elaborates especially on the latter. He criticises Endo (1982) and Kamada (1988) for not separating the two. The theoretically-minded attitude of Fujita is important, for it is only after we have clarified the distinction between the two that we can discuss the importance of each in any meaningful way. In this respect, Fujita’s critical evaluation of Kamada is well justified. However, once we redefine Kamada’s concept of “dramatic effect” in terms of stylistic variation, it can be used effectively in its own right. To talk about the degree of “dramatic effect” of direct discourse does not have any theoretical foundation, but it does reflect the reader’s intuitive response, and therefore it cannot be discarded so easily. This is especially important if we wish to talk about the speech and thought representation in text, rather than on the sentential level.

I believe this argument shares with Fludernik (1993) the basic attitudes towards the speech and thought representation. I will elaborate on this point further in Section 3.

2.5 “Free indirect discourse” in Japanese

After discussing “quasi-direct discourse” in Japanese based on Kuno (1986), Fludernik discusses “free indirect discourse” in Japanese. She writes: “[u]nder the circumstances it is surprising that free indirect discourse should exist at all [in Japanese].” It is surprising. Yet there has not been any general agreement on what the “free indirect discourse” is in Japanese, nor have the characteristics of “free indirect discourse” been clarified as clearly as the grammatical and stylistic characteristics of direct and indirect discourse. Some insightful comments have been made, but not in a way which integrates “free indirect discourse” into the speech and thought representation system as a whole together with direct and indirect discourse. The points I discuss in this section on “free indirect discourse” are meant to contribute to the comprehensive description of the phenomenon in their own right, but they are still rather tentative and restricted in their scope. It also has to be noted here that because of the present lack of theoretical clarification of “free indirect discourse” in Japanese, the application of schematic language representation model of Fludernik (1993) to Japanese in Section 3 is concerned only with direct and indirect discourse, not with “free indirect discourse”.

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The two points which I will discuss in the following sections as modifications to Fludernik's discussion on "free indirect discourse" in Japanese are the terminological problem and the obligatory absence of the reporting clause as an important factor which triggers the reading of "free indirect discourse" in Japanese.

2.5.1 Terminological question

Fludernik uses the term "free indirect discourse" when referring to supposedly corresponding linguistic phenomena in Japanese. However, in the papers published on this subject in Japanese, other alternatives such as "byoosyutsu wahoo" (represented speech) and "taiken wahoo" (erlebte Rede) are frequently preferred. The former is mainly due to the traditional preference for Jespersen's term, and the latter is due to the influence of the corresponding style in German.

The main drawback of using "free indirect discourse" for Japanese is that Japanese does not have the syntactic features which are implied in the term. As I discussed in Subsection 2.3, the syntactic subordination in indirect discourse is not marked as explicitly, and the function of the reporting clause is also different. On the other hand, the advantage of the term "free indirect speech" or ziyuu kansetsu wahoo in Japanese is that it does not show an unnecessary disparity between Japanese and English speech and thought representation.

If the schematic language representation model of Fludernik (1993) is to be applied to Japanese, as I will discuss in Section 3, there will be a shift in emphasis from the formal syntactic categorisation to the stylistic manipulation of expressive elements. The category itself will then lose its relative significance. Actually, the shift may lead us to the point where we have to reconsider the relevance of the term "free indirect speech" even in such languages as English and French, in which the use of the term is well justified. With much less justification in terms of syntax, Japanese may as well reconsider using the term for the style. Fludernik's schematic language representation gives us a good reason to consider the use of the term to refer to the style in Japanese. For the time being, I will continue to refer to the style in question as "free indirect discourse" in Japanese.

2.5.2 "Free indirect discourse" in Japanese

The Japanese example of "free indirect discourse" which Fludernik quotes is as follows:

(42) Yaharu-sensei-wa [kono syunzoo-to-iu-kodomo wa koegawari no sikakete-iru-

(Hosaka 1981: 96-7, quoted Fludernik 1993: 104)

My conversion into the Japanese system of Romanization)

(43) The boy's [Syunzoo] voice would be changing, thought Dr. Yaharu. [...] Maybe he looked like his mother. If so, he would have good, regular features. He would be slim and erect. Too old for the cropped head of the school boy he would be letting his hair grow, and would be shining it with brilliantine. [...] The doctor predated the receipt: March 27, sixteen years before. This 27 of March was an important day for Dr. Yaharu, so there could be no doubt about the date. It was the first day after he resigned from the university hospital and opened a hospital of his own. The morning was cloudy, but later the sky cleared. Noon passed, and not a patient came.'

(Quoted Hosaka 1981: 96-7, quoted Fludernik 1993: 104)

(43) is the English translation of (42) and it is translated in a way that uses English free indirect discourse when Hosaka thinks that the corresponding Japanese is regarded as “free indirect discourse”. Fludernik gives a list of the forms that determine the speculative nature of the discourse. These are:

(44) the *daroo* suffix
(45) the subjective modifier *mosi*
(46) the reflexive pronoun *zibun*
(47) ‘expressive’ features
(48) colloquial constructions typical of Japanese oral discourse

The features (44)-(48), however, are not sufficient to guarantee the reading of a passage as “free indirect discourse”. There is a set of features whose presence interfere with the
reading of the passage as “free indirect discourse”, with personal pronouns and the reporting clause being included in this group. For example, if one adds the reporting clause to the second sentence of the passage (42), which starts with “mosi”, the reader’s response to the sentence would be different. Compare the first part of (43) with the following passages. In (49) reporting clauses with speech act verbs have been added, and in (50) reporting clauses with thought act verbs have been added.

(49) Yaharu-sensei-wa [kono syunzoo-to-i-kodomo wa koegawari no sikakete-iru-tokoro-daroo] to omotta. [...] mosi hahasya-ni yooboo-ga nite-iru nara, me-hanadati-mo totonotte-iru daraoo to hitorigoto-o itta (said to oneself)/ tubuyaita (murmured).

(50) Yaharu-sensei-wa [kono syunzoo-to-i-kodoo wa koegawari no sikakete-iru-tokoro-daroo] to omotta. [...] mosi hahasya-ni yooboo-ga nite-iru nara, me-hanadati-mo totonotte-iru daraoo to kangaeta (thought)/omotta (thought, felt).

Both (49) and (50) are ambiguous in terms of grammar and it is difficult to decide if they are direct or indirect discourse, that is, (49) can be direct or indirect speech and (50) can be either direct or indirect thought. These were discussed in Sub-subsection 2.3.1 as the second type of ambiguous cases between direct and indirect discourse. The preceding literature has not included these in Japanese “free indirect discourse”, and it needs further discussion how to deal with this type of speech and thought representation.

The list of “free indirect discourse” features provided by Hosaka and Suzuki (1993) includes the obligatory absence of the reporting clause, and as far as the current understanding of “free indirect discourse” in Japanese are concerned, Fludernik might as well include this condition on the reporting clause in her discussion.

2.6 Interim summary

In Section 2, I have discussed the manner in which Fludernik (1993) discusses speech and thought representation in Japanese. It was discussed that the inclusion of the linguistic data of Japanese into the discussion of free indirect discourse and other styles of speech and thought representation is one of the contributions which Fludernik has made. However, some of her discussions on Japanese were found to need modifications. These can be summarised as follows:

(51) There are ambiguous cases between direct and indirect discourse in Japanese in
terms of formal characteristics. To define direct discourse as unmarked and to interpret these ambiguous cases as direct discourse is arbitrary. Therefore (6) in Sub-subsection 2.3.1 needs to be modified.

(52) The presence/absence of the original speaker’s communicative mood needs to be added as a marker of the distinction between direct and indirect discourse in Japanese. The communicative mood may be marked explicitly or may be marked just implicitly.

(53) Grammatical distinction between direct and indirect discourse and stylistic variation in speech and thought representation in Japanese should be discussed separately. To discuss the two together without distinction is due to the “direct discourse fallacy”. “Quasi-direct discourse” in Japanese should be discussed in terms of stylistic variation.

(54) The term “free indirect discourse” does not reflect the linguistic reality in Japanese, and needs reconsideration.

(55) The importance of the absence of the reporting clause in Japanese “free indirect discourse” needs to be stressed.

(56) Some of Fludernik’s examples of Japanese were presented or interpreted in an incorrect way, and need modification.

With these modifications made on Fludernik’s discussions on Japanese in mind, I will make an attempt to apply the schematic language representation model to Japanese in the next chapter.

3 Application of the schematic language representation model of Fludernik (1993) to Japanese

3.1 Schematic language representation model of Fludernik (1993)

3.1.1 Outline of Fludernik’s model

The schematic language representation model is explained in Chapter 8 of Fludernik (1993). The assumption underlying her model is that “all linguistic speech and thought representation relies on a mechanism of typification and schematization which is independent of actual speech and thought processes and can be analysed in terms of a fiction ‘manufactured’ by means of language, by means of linguistic devices” (398). In this section, I will describe the outline of Fludernik’s model.

First in Section 8.1 (398-408), Fludernik presents “a series of typicality features in passages of free indirect discourse which are meant to illustrate standard ways in which
language is used to represent, not one specific speech or thought act by a specific person, but a typical or schematic image of a linguistic expression whose provenance is determined contextually rather than derivationally” (399). Then, in Section 8.2 (409–414), she proves that similar typical or schematic representation takes place even in direct discourse, even though we tend to assume that direct discourse is a literal, faithful reproduction of the “original speech”. The categories of anti-mimeticism, or of typical and schematic representation, which are exemplified in Section 8.1 and Section 8.2 are listed as follows (414):

(57) purely invented discourse (‘speaking’ gestures of objects)
(58) hypothetical or speculative utterances or thoughts
(59) attributions of attitude or opinions to individuals
(60) attributions of attitudes or opinions to groups of people
(61) habitual utterances or thoughts
(62) similar utterances condensed into one set of speech
(63) several utterances by a group of people condensed into one typical utterance
(64) clichéd stylization of an utterance or thought act, in which the platitude of the style argues for typification
(65) explicit denials of mimeticism such as ‘etc.’, ‘such-and-such’, ‘in so many words’, ‘to that purpose’ and the like
(66) open admission of the fictional nature of quoted discourse

After observing that the similar phenomena are found in the oral discourse in Section 8.3 (414–423), Fludernik proposes “a model of schematic language representation” in Section 8.4 (423–429), whose emphasis is on the following two points.

Firstly, the schematic language representation emphasizes the anti-mimeticism of speech and thought representation. Expressive syntactic constructions in direct discourse, for example, do not “mimetically evoke the flavour of the original discourse” but they are “idealistic projections of the current speaker utilizing a preformulated repertory of stock phrases” (426). They are not viewed as the “‘natural’ inherent property” of direct discourse but as a “linguistic device simply to signal or emphasize emotionality, complementing intonational and para-linguistic factors” (428). Expressive syntax in free indirect discourse is viewed in the same way.

Secondly, the model also emphasizes the significance of the stylistic and expressive features used in speech and thought representation compared to the syntactic features.
Fludernik argues that “formal properties, namely such as those that have traditionally been called upon to distinguish between the (free) (in)direct discourse categories, are cognitively much less significant in the reading process than the manipulation of expressive signals that can claim to attract much higher readerly attention levels” (429).

In Section 8.5 (430–2), after discussing how deixis, subjectivity and consciousness interrelate, Fludernik concludes the chapter by stressing the prior status of the current speaker, that is, the reporting speaker in any form of speech and thought representation: “All language, even in free indirect discourse, is the language of the current speaker or text. The differences in subordination, temporal shifting and referential shift can all be dealt with as varying degrees of authorial control. If the framing discourse finally shifts pronouns to assume the embedded speaker’s I, this is only the most radical commitment to expressivity on a scale of numerous possible devices of linguistic subjectivity” (432).

To sum up, Fludernik notes the following points in the schematic language representation mode:

(67) anti-mimeticism in speech and thought representation
(68) cognitive significance of manipulation of expressive signals compared to formal properties
(69) authorial control of the current speaker or text over varying degrees of expressive syntax

As Fludernik herself states in the concluding chapter, her findings need “to be checked against the situation in other and particularly non-Indo-European languages” (458). However, before proceeding to the application of the model to Japanese, I will discuss (67) further for the convenience of the application. The ten categories of anti-mimeticism (57)–(66), will be discussed in order to clarify the interrelation of the ten categories.

3.1.2 Interrelation of Fludernik’s ten categories of anti-mimeticism

Each of the ten categories of anti-mimeticism outlined by Fludernik contains several factors relevant to anti-mimeticism. These factors are divided into three groups. The first group is concerned with the type of the schematic representation, which includes: the condensed, the contracted, the hypothetical, and the attributed. The condensed and the contracted are concerned with the supposed change added to the content of the imaginary original speech or thought. The difference between the two is the matter of degree, and
extreme cases of the condensed are regarded as the contracted. The invented, the hypothetical and the attributed are concerned with the epistemological status of the reported speech or thought.

The second group is concerned with what is supposed to be “changed” for the schematic representation: the length, the frequency and the number of speakers or thinkers of speech or thought are included here. They are mainly related to the condensed and the contracted types of schematic representation: we can condense/contract the length of the speech/thought, and make a very long speech into a short speech. We can also condense/contract the frequency and make a series of speeches or thoughts into one. It is also possible to condense/contract the number of speakers and represent several utterances or thoughts by a group of people in one typical discourse.

The third group is concerned with how to realise the schematic representation, which includes clichéd stylization, explicit denials of mimeticism, and open admission of the fictional nature. It should be noted that there are the cases in which the schematic representation is realised through other means. For example, it can be realised through the semantic property of the speech/thought or the narrative report of the speech/thought act. The discussion of this section will be summarised as in the next chart:

**Chart: Interrelation of Fludernik's categories of anti-mimeticism**

![Chart diagram]

3.2 Anti-mimeticism in Japanese speech and thought representation

In this subsection, I will suggest that anti-mimeticism is found in Japanese speech and thought representation and demonstrate this by analysing several examples. If we divide Fludernik's categories of anti-mimeticism into three groups which are concerned with dif-
different aspects, then it is possible for a passage to illustrate more than one factor of anti-mimeticism. The underlined descriptions in bold letters in this section are the anti-mimetic factors illustrated in the subsequent examples.

The condensed speech representation: length

(70) “Kazoku ga naitte koto o sitte kara, kyyuni anata o sukini natta no yo...
family/NOM/lack/thing/ACC/know/since/suddenly/you/ACC/like/became/PAR
/PAR

hokano koto wa watasi ni wa wakaranai.
other/thing/TOP/I/DAT/TOP/cannot understand

Ani ga ita toki mo zutto hitoribotti datta yoona kimosuru noni.”
brother/NOM/there was/when/too/still/alone/was/like/feel too/but

Ryoko wa, hotondo hitoban kakatte soreyake no koto o hanasita nodatta.
Ryoko/TOP/almost/all night/took/that much/GEN/thing/ACC/spoke/it was that
(Masuda 1988: 259–261)

(“When I learned you have no family, I suddenly fell in love with you. I know nothing else ... although I feel as if I had been by myself even when my brother was alive.”

It took almost all night for Ryoko to talk that much.)

This is an example of the condensed representation of speech. The speech lasts for two pages, with only the beginning and the ending being quoted in (70). The speech is represented in direct discourse, which is clearly marked with such features as the quotation marks, the first person pronoun watasi referring to the reported speaker and the sentence final particles no and yo. However, the sentence of narrative report of speech act after the quotation Ryoko wa, hotondo hitoban kakatte soreyake no koto o hanasita nodatta or “It took almost all night for Ryoko to talk that much” implies that the reported speech is anti-mimetic. Although the speech is fairly long, i.e. two pages, it would not take all night to utter.

This example of Japanese is comparable to the English example Fludernik quoted as
contracted speech representation from Austen’s Northanger Abbey, which Page (1988) had originally pointed out:

(71) “I [Catherine Morland] do not quite despair yet. **I shall not give it up till a quarter after twelve.** This is just the time of day for it to clear up, and I do think it looks a little lighter. **There, it is twenty minutes after twelve,** and now I **shall** give it up entirely.”

(Quoted Fludernik 1993: 411, my emphasis in bold)

A similar kind of condensed/contracted schematic representation takes place in (70) and (71), the only difference being that in (70) the condensed nature is implied in the narrative report of the speech act after the quotation, whereas in (71) the contracted/condensed nature is inferable from the content of the speech itself.

**The condensed speech representation: frequency (representation of habitual utterance)**

(72) Mimi ni ana o akeru to, soko kara kooun ga koboreotiru to,  
    ear(s)/DAT/hole(s)/ACC/open/if/there/from/good luck/NOM/leak away/QUOT

    Yooko no haha wa **kutiguse no yooni itteita.**
    Yoko/GEN/mother/TOP/pet saying/like/used to say

    ([Yoko’s] mother used to say that if you pierced your ears, good luck would leak away through the holes.)

    (Mori 1989: 179)

This is an example of the schematic representation of speech, where frequent utterances are condensed into a single speech. The reported speech has no explicit marker of either direct or indirect discourse. The habituality is made explicit in the reporting clause with **kutiguse no yooni itteita** or “used to say like a pet phrase.”

Fludernik’s English example of the condensed schematic representation of habitual utterances is a passage from Tristram Shandy.

(73) “Was I an absolute prince,” he would say,…
Here the habituality is signalled by *would* in the reporting clause, and this is comparable to the Japanese example (74), where habituality is also marked in the reporting clause.

**The condensed speech representation (the number of speakers)**

(74) “Suzuko-san ga itte kureru n'nara. Kokonti no sutahhu ni nariatai yo” to,
Miss Suzuko/NOM/say/give/if/this place/GEN/staff/DAT/want to be/PAR/QUOT

otokotati wa, ikudoon’ni Suzuko ni tugeta.
men/TOP/with one voice/Suzuko/DAT/told

(Hanai 1991: 136)

(“If Suzuko tells me so [=you tell me so, Suzuko]. I want to join the staff of this company,” the men said with one voice.)

The reported discourse is explicitly marked as direct discourse with the quotation marks and the sentence final particle *yo*. That (74) represents a typical speech of more than one speakers is implied in the reporting clause, *otokotati wa, ikudoonni Suzuko ni tugeta*. (the men said with one voice).

Fludernik provides English free indirect discourse examples where a “*vox communis*” (407) is being represented. Compared to the English examples, my example above is rather short, and not a representation of “*vox communis*” but a very brief summary of what the several speakers said.

**The invented/attributed speech and thought representation: admission of the fictional nature**

(75) Doo sita no? to Suzuko ga **sigusa dake de kiku**.
how/did/PAR/?/QUOT/Suzuko/NOM/gesture/only/with/ask

Ii no ii no, to Yuuko ga enpitu o motta te o hirahirato hutta.
O. K./PAR/O. K./PAR/QUOT/Yuko/SUB/pencil/ACC/had/hand/ACC/fluttering
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/waved

(Hanai 1991: 175-6)

([lit.] “What’s the matter?” Suzuki asked only with gesture.
Yuko waved her hand holding a pencil, “Nothing, it is O. K.”)

The first sentence is an instance of invented or attributed speech representation in the form of direct discourse, which is clearly marked with the sentence final particle *no*. That the speech is just invented/attributed rather than actually uttered is explicitly mentioned in the reporting clause, *to Suzuki ga sigusa dake de kiku* or “Suzuki asked only with gesture.” Whether the speech was “real” or not is not clearly mentioned in the second sentence. The preceding sentence may encourage the reader to interpret it also as “speech” not uttered but conveyed with gesture.

There are quite a few instances of this type of speech and thought representation in Japanese. As is the case with (75), speech or thought is frequently invented or attributed as a hidden meaning of a gesture. The fictional nature of the reported speech or thought is made explicit as it is presented as an interpretation of a gesture. One reason that this type of schematic representation is allowed to occur frequently in Japanese is that there are a wider range of verbs which can co-occur with the “-*to* clause”. The “reporting verb” of the second sentence in (75), for example, is *hutta* “waved”. Verbs of various actions can follow a reported speech. This represents a relatively flexible semantic relation between the reporting and the reported clause, and this is one of the important factors which enable Japanese to realise schematic language representation. Consider another example:

(76) Sa mo aroo, to hitobito wa unazukikawasita nodearu ga,
thus/too/will be/QUOT/people/TOP/nodded to each other/it is that/but

(Tanabe 1992: 205)

([lit.] People nodded to each other, “That must be the case.”)

In this case, *unazukikawasita* “nodded to each other” is used as the verb in the reporting clause. The reported clause *Sa mo aroo* or “That must be the case” is direct discourse with the speaker’s mood conveyed through the auxiliary verb of inference in *aroo*. The “reporting” verb in the -*to* clause *unazukikawasita* (nodding to each other) conveys neither a speech act nor a thought act. The gesture of nodding to each other implies that people are sharing a common feeling and confirming the feeling either verbally or non-verbally. What is represented in the reported clause must be the general feeling of the people or
the gist of what people were talking about when they nodded to each other. In fact, it is difficult to tell whether this is an instance of schematic representation of speech or that of thought.

**The hypothetical speech representation: admission of the fictional nature**

This type of anti-mimetic representation often appears as hypothetical speech within a character’s thought representation. For example:

(77) Sikasi, otoko ga dokonidemo iru goku heibon’na ningen dakara da
    but/the man/NOM/anywhere/be/very/ordinary/human being/because/be
    to wa, ikuranandemo ienai.
    QUOT/TOP/by any means/cannot say

    (Mori 1989: 17)

(It is impossible to say that it is because he is an ordinary man one finds everywhere.)

As the fictional nature of the utterance is explicitly mentioned in the reporting clause, *to wa, ikuranandemo ienai “it is impossible to say”*, the represented speech is not what is uttered but what cannot be uttered. The reported speech in the English translation that I provided uses indirect discourse for the reported clause, but actually the Japanese is an ambiguous case between direct or indirect discourse. The whole sentence can be a part of thought representation of the supposed speaker of the reported clause of (77), which is implied by the present tense of the whole sentence in *ienai “cannot say”* or “is impossible to say”

The hypothetical speech also appears in the form of direct discourse with dramatic effect.

(78) “Kedo, watasi, zuutto mae kara —”
    but/1/very/before/since

    kimetemasita, to tzuukeru no wa, sukosi tamerawrete.
    had decided-POL/QUOT/continue/thing/TOP/a little/hesitated
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([lit.] "But for a long time, I...,"
 she hesitated to continue, have been determined)

(Hanai 1991: 197)

The first part of the reporting clause, which is within the quotation marks, is supposedly uttered in the text, but the latter half is hypothetical. Semantically speaking, the verb “tuzukeru” (continue) in the reporting clause should take only the hypothetical part within its scope, but the two parts of represented speech can be read together as the reported speech preceding the “-to clause” despite the difference in their epistemological status. The ending of (78) is not the standard ending form. The verb “tamerawarete” is in the continuous form, and gives the impression that the sentence belongs to a character’s thought.

As the examples above have shown, various factors of anti-mimeticism are found in the speech and thought representation in the contemporary Japanese fiction.

3.3 Pragmatic and stylistic aspects of the speech and thought representation in Japanese and Fludernik’s model

The schematic language representation model of Fludernik’s emphasises the authorial control of the current speaker and the cognitive importance of the expressive elements. This was discussed in Sub-subsection 3.1.1 (68) and (69). Lately these two aspects have also been focussed on as important points in the analysis of the Japanese speech and thought representation. Among others, Fujita (1995) and Kamada (1988) can be named as approaches that share Fludernik’s assumptions to some extent.

Firstly, Fludernik’s emphasis that the current speaker or text has the authorial control over the varying degrees of expressive syntax finds its counterpart in Fujita (1995), which clarifies the pragmatic aspect of the speech and thought representation of Japanese. In fact, his analysis of Japanese through the pragmatic concept of “the current speaker’s projection”9 shows that Fludernik’s schematic model can be applied to Japanese as far as the anti-mimeticism and the current speaker’s authorial control are concerned.

Fujita (1995) argues that the syntactic and the pragmatic aspects of speech and thought representation in Japanese should be discussed separately. He explains that the mechanism of “the current (reporting) speaker’s projection” controls the pragmatic aspect of speech and thought representation. Also it has to be emphasised that speech or thought representation neither reflects nor even needs an “original” utterance to report. This was illustrated with a number of Japanese examples.
The speaker’s projection in Fujita’s framework means that any instance of speech and thought representation is under the full control of the current reporting speaker, and that it is the pragmatic function that influences the speaker. It is found here that Fludernik’s assumptions of anti-mimeticism and of the authorial control of the current speaker are shared by Fujita. Actually, in one of his notes, he refers to English speech and thought representation, and discusses that his argument can be applied to English, arguing that an example of speech representation “He said you must go there.” does not necessarily reflect or assume the existence of the original speech “You must go there”, for it could have been, for example, “Go there.” that was actually uttered.

Secondly, the other aspect of Fludernik’s schematic model, the cognitive significance of the manipulation of expressive signals compared to the formal properties is related to the concept of the “dramatic effect” proposed by Kamada (1988), which was discussed in Subsection 2.4. “Dramatic effect” proposed by Kamada is concerned with such explicit elements as the polite form endings and sentence final particles, and their absence corresponds the lack of dramatic effect.

Unlike the original intention of Kamada (1988), I discussed in Subsection 2.4. that the “dramatic effect” and the related category of semi-direct discourse should be discussed as stylistic rather than grammatical features of Japanese speech and thought representation. This was because semi-direct discourse has no theoretical grounding concerning its semi-directness in contrast with full-directness. This is not to say, however, that the presence or absence of dramatic effect is insignificant. It reflects the reader’s intuitive response to a certain instance of speech and thought representation for which the term is well chosen. Placing the emphasis on the effect on the reader and the reader’s response leads to Fludernik’s emphasis on the cognitive significance over formal categorical difference.

To summarise, the research on speech and thought representation based on the linguistic data in Japanese and the research based mainly on the data in English, French and German have reached a similar interpretation of the mechanism of speech and thought representation concerning the pragmatic and stylistic aspects.

3.4 Critical evaluation of the application of Fludernik’s model to Japanese

In the preceding two subsections I have discussed how the three important features of Fludernik’s schematic language representation model are illustrated by linguistic phenomena in Japanese. The discussion with the anti-mimetic examples in Subsection 3.2 was not meant to describe the applicability of the model in a detailed and comprehensive way, but to illustrate the general tendency toward the applicability. The discussion in Subsection
3.3 suggested that the pragmatic and stylistic aspects of Japanese speech and thought representation can be discussed in line with the assumptions of Fludernik’s schematic language representation model.

However, there is a certain limitation to the application of Fludernik’s model to Japanese. The model does not set a boundary for the type of sentences which can or cannot be discussed within its framework. In other words, there are no syntactic conditions set to the instances discussed within the model. Therefore, the application of the model cannot be expected to contribute to syntactic theorisation of the speech and thought representation in Japanese.

For example, the syntactic behaviour of various verbs has been clarified as an important feature of Japanese speech and thought representation. As there is a semantically wider range of verbs which can co-occur with the reported clause in Japanese, this is a relatively complex feature and needs detailed analysis of example sentences. The schematic language representation model will not be useful to clarify this aspect of Japanese speech and thought representation.

Rather, it is possible that the range of the syntactic phenomena that the analyser will include as the object of the analysis may control the applicability of the model to the language. If we include into the analysis of structures composed with verbs that describe neither speech nor thought act, as I did in Subsection 3.1, it provides a large number of examples which can be analysed within the model. This inclusion is based on the assumption that the structures which take the *-to clause will be regarded as speech and thought representation. This knowledge of syntactic feature is necessary before the application.

For another example, I did not include the *-kotoo clause in my examples in Subsection 3.3, because the syntactic status of the clause allows only indirect discourse. This is frequently discussed as a type of subordinate clause different to reported speech, even though Maynard (1984) discusses it as a type of speech and thought representation.

It can be expected that the application of the schematic language representation model will meet with similar problems in other languages. However, it will be useful for the discussion on the semantic, pragmatic, stylistic and cognitive aspects of the speech and thought representation in various languages. Yet, inevitably the analyser has to know which types of sentences are going to be included in the analysis using the model, otherwise it may lead to just general observations. The analysis of the examples in Subsection 3.3 which has led to this stage, therefore, needs to be developed in combination with syntactic discussions if it is to form the basis for more detailed discussions.
4 Conclusions

The present paper has discussed the speech and thought representation in Japanese based on the discussions of Fludernik (1993). In Section 2, I have shown that the discussions on Japanese speech and thought representation of Fludernik need modification by stressing the following points which Fludernik has not mentioned. Firstly, it is true that there are cases in Japanese speech and thought representation which cannot be decided either to be direct or to be indirect discourse, but similar ambiguous cases are allowed for even in English. Secondly, the presence/absence of the communicative mood of the original speaker is the main distinction between direct and indirect discourse in Japanese. Thirdly, the "quasi-direct discourse" should be discussed in terms of stylistic variation, rather than as a grammatical category. Lastly, "free indirect discourse" in Japanese needs further discussion on its nature as well as on the term itself.

In Section 3, I have discussed the applicability to Japanese of the schematic language representation model Fludernik has proposed. It was stated that the anti-mimeticism of speech and thought representation can be observed in Japanese. It was also discussed that the schematic model was found to be a powerful aid for clarifying the semantic, pragmatic, stylistic and cognitive aspects of speech and thought representation in Japanese. However, it had to be noted that if it were to go beyond the analysis of general tendencies, the application has to be carried out together with the syntactic clarification of what should be included into the instances of speech and thought representation.

Currently there is a lack of consensus on what constitutes "free indirect discourse" in Japanese. A consequence of this is that I have limited the examples in Section 3 to direct and indirect speech, for which there is a much better theoretical understanding. Further research in this area is obviously required in order to locate "free indirect discourse" in speech and thought representation in Japanese. Once this has been done it will be interesting to compare with other languages, either with or without the schematic language representation model of Fludernik.

Notes

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2. According to the traditional formal definition, free indirect discourse is the type of discourse in which someone's speech or thought is represented with some expressive elements and the syntac-
tic independence of direct discourse, while the temporal and referential consonance with the quoting instance is shared with indirect discourse. A variety of terms has been coined since the end of the last century when the style first attracted researchers' interest. In the present paper, the term “free indirect discourse” is used because it is the term used by Fludernik (1993), whose discussions and language model this paper focuses on. I will argue later, however, that the term does not actually reflect the linguistic reality in Japanese. Therefore quotation marks will be used when the term refers to Japanese.

3. The Japanese system of Romanization is used in this paper except certain proper names.

In the gloss, the following abbreviations are used: ACC = accusative, DAT = dative, GEN = genitive, IMP = imperative, NOM = nominative, TOP = topic marker, PAR = particle, POL = politeness marker and QUOT = quotative marker.

4. I wish to thank Yasushi Suzuki for helping me to have access to an earlier version of Kuno (1986) held at Tsukuba University.

5. In this analysis, the imperative is regarded as one of the formal types of expression (kyoogen-nriekk), which do not necessarily correspond with the categories of mood. The argument here is that the imperative does not justify the direct discourse reading, even though it has been discussed as such in some of the preceding literature.

6. There are some other points in Fludernik's interpretation of Japanese lexical items which I find need modification. For example, her criticism on Maynard (1984) concerning the inclusion of polite -masu and -desu forms in direct discourse does not seem to reflect the reality when she argues that “these are actually untypical of colloquial speech which prefers the -ru and da ‘infinitives’” (109). Another example is concerning the excessive emphasis on the difference between female and male speakers. It is not correct for her to say a first person singular wataku's 'I' is a typical male form, while a female speaker is expected to use atasi (424). The difference between the two is the degree of formality, and the informal atasi is used mainly by women, while the formal watakusu is generally used by both sexes.

7. For example, Hosaka and Suzuki (1993) has provided a list of “free indirect discourse” features in Japanese. But reflexivity is not taken into consideration among other possible features that are missing in the list.

8. The corresponding passage in Johnson (1993) is as follows: “But she simply couldn’t tell him that it was because he was an ordinary man, the type, one finds everywhere” (17). The use of the third person pronoun and the past tense reflects the whole structure of the story, that is, this passage is translated into free indirect discourse. The translation I gave to (77) is more context-free.


References


